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Abstract
We formulate an analytic equilibrium model for simultaneously func-
tioning electricity market and a market for Green Certificates. The major
focus of the paper is the eﬀect of market power in a Green Certificate
system. One of the main results from the analysis is that the certificate
system faced with market power basically may collapse into a system of
per unit subsidies.
1 Introduction
Many countries have adopted the goal to enhance the role of renewable sources
in energy supply. It is, for example, a stated goal by the EU to raise the share
of electricity based on renewable generation sources from 14 to 22% of total
electricity generation by 2010 (see EU/COM (2000)).1 Typically, in order to
promote the generation of green electricity, the relative cost disadvantage of en-
vironmentally friendly electricity generation technologies has been compensated
by the national authorities through diﬀerent kinds of subsidy schemes. One ex-
ample is the fixed-price system used in e.g. Spain and Germany, in which the
producers of green electricity get a specified fixed price per unit of their electric-
ity, independent of the quantity they generate. Other subsidy alternatives are
investment subsidies and tax reductions for producers of green electricity. The
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1Throughout the article, black and green electricity will refer to electricity generated from
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liberalization of the electricity markets has, however, induced an extra challenge
on the countries in their choice of policy measures to promote the provision of
green electricity, as the means must be in accordance with market principles.
One idea which has been adopted as a possible alternative in many countries
is the introduction of a market for Green Certificates (from this point referred
to as GCs). The Netherlands has already, since 1998, used a system of ”green
labelling”, which is a voluntary version of the GC-system. Sweden and Den-
mark are examples of countries that are close to actually introducing a market
for GCs, as it is the intention of both the Swedish and the Danish authorities
to have GC systems fully eﬀective by 2003. It seems likely that in the long run
all the Member States will support a common EU standard for the markets for
GCs. In addition to the EU Member States, countries like Australia, China,
India and the US are also considering the introduction of GCs. Despite its
popularity, it seems fair to say that the general functioning of the GC market
has not yet been fully understood. However, research contributions have been
made by e.g. Voogt et al. (1999), Morthorst (2000 and 2001), Amundsen and
Mortensen (2001, 2002), Bye et al. (2002) and Jensen and Skytte (2002).
In short, the GC market consists of sellers and buyers of certificates. The
sellers are the producers of electricity using renewable sources. The producers
are each allowed to sell an amount of certificates corresponding to the electricity
they feed into the electricity network. The purchasers of certificates are con-
sumers/distribution companies that are required by the government to hold a
certain percentage of certificates corresponding to their total consumption/end-
use deliveries of electricity.2 The GCs are seen as permits for consuming elec-
tricity. Hence, this system implies that the producers using renewable energy
sources receive both the wholesale price and a certificate for each kWh fed into
the electricity network. In this way the GC system is supposed to induce new
investments in green electricity generation. An additional indirect eﬀect of in-
creasing the provision of green electricity will be to reduce CO2 emission if the
development of renewable energy technologies is substituting energy production
from fossil fuel fired plants.
In the following we formulate an analytic equilibrium model for a GC sys-
tem. A basic assumption in the model is that the ”percentage requirement” for
the possession of certificates of consumers/distribution companies functions as a
check on total electricity consumption, as the total number of certificates avail-
able are constrained by the total capacity of renewable technologies.3 Hence, a
requirement of e.g. 20% implies that total consumption can be no larger than
five times the electricity produced from renewable sources, unless the price of
certificates tends to increase above an upper price bound specified by the au-
thorities. This price bound, which is used in most of the proposed GC systems,
functions as a penalty which the consumers must pay if they don’t fulfil the
2Italy is an exception in this respect as the Italian system is supposed to put the purchase
obligation on the producers.
3In many countries wind mills constitute a significant part of the green production tech-
nology. The electricity production from wind mills will typically vary a lot, giving rise to
considerable variations in the total production of green electricity between diﬀerent years.
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percentage requirement, i.e. to be allowed to consume more electricity than five
times the amount of certificates they have bought. In the model we also repre-
sent a lower price bound for the certificate price. This price bound is relevant
in case the production of green electricity exceeds the demand for certificates.
If this is the case, the State will buy the excess supply of certificates at a price
corresponding to the lower price bound. Not all the countries considering the
introduction of a GC system will include a minimum price of the certificates,
but the proposed Danish GC system is using such a lower price bound. We will
concentrate on the analysis of the market itself and do not in this setting ad-
dress the question of whether such a system is economically sound as compared
with other alternatives of stimulating the generation of green electricity. Fur-
thermore, we do not consider any uncertainty or financial markets for forwards
or futures trade in certificates, nor do we consider an international system with
trade of GCs.
The major focus of this paper is the eﬀect of market power in a GC system.
We will use our model to characterize the equilibrium conditions for various
levels of competition in the electricity and the GC markets. We will start by
assuming perfect competition in both the electricity and the GC markets and
thereafter go through the three cases of market power in either one or both of
the markets. In addition we look at a case with a monopolistic company that
controls both generation technologies. Throughout the paper we assume Nash-
Cournot (NC-) behavior.4 As will be shown, the GC system does not always
produce straight forward results. It turns out that the existence of market
power to a large extent will drive the certificate price to either the lower or
the upper price bound and thereby reduce the GC system to a system of direct
subsidies financed through excise taxes. As market power is likely to exist
in many cases, this is a result that should be given serious consideration in the
discussions and development of alternative GC systems. In our analysis we focus
particularly on the generation of green electricity under diﬀerent assumptions
of competition in the markets. One interesting result from this analysis is that
market power in the generation of black electricity can actually promote an
increase in the generation of green electricity as compared with the result under
perfect competition. Among the other surprising results are that an increase in
the percentage requirement, and an introduction of a CO2 tax on the producers
of black electricity in combination with a GC system, actually both can have
the eﬀect as to reduce the generation of green electricity.
The first section of the paper presents the model. The next section presents
and analyses the equilibrium in the case of perfect competition in both the
electricity and the GC market. Thereafter follows the cases of market power
in the generation of black electricity, market power in the generation of green
electricity, market power in both generation technologies, and market power in
the joint generation of green and black electricity. In section 8 we introduce
4Alternative models of describing the behavior in the electricity market exist (e.g. Bertrand
games, supply function games and auction games). For a discussion of why NC-behavior is a
reasonable model, see Borenstain and Bushnell (1999) and Borenstein, Bushnell and Knittel
(1999).
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a CO2 tax on the producers of black electricity and analyze the eﬀects on the
generation of green and black electricity. Finally, the last section summarizes
and concludes.
2 The model
The following model is designed to capture a long run situation for the simul-
taneous functioning electricity market and a market for GCs.5 We will use the
following list of variables:
p = consumer price of electricity
s = price of GCs
s = upper price bound of GCs
s = lower price bound of GCs
q = wholesale price of electricity
x = total consumption of electricity
y = generation of black electricity
z = generation of green electricity
α = percentage of green electricity consumption
gd = demand for GCs
t = CO2 tax
We apply the following general functions:
The inverse demand function is:
p (x) , with
∂p (x)
∂x
= p0 < 0.
The cost function for the producers of black electricity is assumed given by:
c = c (y) , with c
0
(y) > 0 and c
00
(y) > 0.
The rationale for choosing an increasing long run marginal cost function
for this industry, is that the expansion of output may drive up the price of
CO2-emission permits or CO2-taxes to comply with national CO2-emission con-
straints. The cost function for the producers of green electricity is assumed given
by:
h (z) , with h0 (z) > 0 and h
00
(z) > 0.
The rationale for choosing an increasing long run marginal cost function for
this industry is that good sites for wind-mills may be in scarce supply by nature.
The two groups of producers deliver electricity to a common wholesale mar-
ket, from where distribution companies purchase electricity for end-use deliver-
ies. The distribution companies are assumed to act as profit maximizers.
In the model we have two markets, one market for electricity and one market
for GCs. As we work our way through the diﬀerent market structures we will
apply the subscripts c and m to the endogenous variables in order to indicate
5For a short run version of the model, see Amundsen and Mortensen (2001).
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whether the markets are competitive, or if there is market power involved in one
or both of the generation technologies. The first subscript will correspond to
the market structure among the producers of black electricity, while the second
subscript is used to describe the market structure in the generation of green
electricity. qcc will thus refer to the wholesale price of electricity in the case
of perfect competition among both kinds of electricity producers. In the case
of market power in the generation of black electricity and perfect competition
among the producers of green electricity, the variable for the wholesale price will
be qmc, and so on. In addition we will use the subscript M for the case where
we consider market power in the joint generation of black and green electricity.
We start by considering a market with perfect competition all around.
3 Perfect competition
For the case of perfect competition in both markets all the profit maximizing
market participants are price takers. In order to simplify the presentation we
are suppressing the subscripts concerning the market structure at this point.
The producers of black electricity act as if they jointly maximize:
MaxΠ (y) = qy − c (y) .
The first order condition for an optimum in the competitive market is:
q∗ = c
0
(y) .
For each unit of green electricity generated there will be issued one certificate.
The producers of green electricity will sell all their certificates and will thus earn
the wholesale price plus the GC-price per unit of electricity they generate.6
Jointly they act as to maximize:
MaxΠ (z) = [q + s] z − h (z) .
The first order condition is:
q + s = h
0
(z).
For each unit of electricity bought and sold to the end users the distribution
companies will have to pay the wholesale price plus a proportion α of the cer-
tificate price in accordance with the percentage requirement. The distribution
companies are throughout the article assumed not to enjoy any market power.
Hence, jointly they act as to maximize:
MaxΠ (x) = px− [q + αs]x.
6Given the assumption of perfect competition in the generation of green electricity it is
obvious that the generators will always sell all their certificates. However, as we will see later,
market power in the generation of green electricity makes it relevant for these generators to
consider whether they can utilize their market power to aﬀect the price of GCs in order to
increase their profit from the GC and the electricity market.
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The first order condition is:
p = q + αs.
In the market for GCs the demand is given by:
gd = αx.
3.1 cc-equilibrium
Given the objective functions and the first order conditions we can specify the
equilibrium for the competitive markets. The key variables used in the analysis
are the equilibrium price, generated quantities of black and green electricity and
total consumption of electricity. These will depend on whether the price of GCs
in equilibrium, s∗, is within the specified price interval, i.e. s < s∗ < s, or on
either the upper or lower price bound. As long as the price of GCs is within
the interval, total consumption of electricity is given by x = z
∗
α
. This quantity
constraint implied by the percentage requirement is sometimes referred to as the
allowable consumption level. In the case of s∗ = s, the demand for GCs is less
than z∗, and there is an excess supply of GCs. It is assumed (as in the Danish
GC-proposal) that the State guarantees to buy the otherwise unsold certificates
at a price equal to s. This means that total electricity consumption is decreasing
compared with the preceding case. If the price of GCs in equilibrium turns out
to be equal to the upper price bound, s, demand for certificates exceeds the
maximum possible supply. In this case the consumers are allowed to buy more
black electricity if they pay a ”fine” equal to s per unit of extra electricity
consumption. Including now the subscripts for market form, and assuming
that c
0
(y∗cc) and h
0
(z∗cc) are representing the aggregate marginal cost functions,
we have the following result for the key variables in equilibrium under perfect
competition:
• For the case of s < s∗cc < s
p (x∗cc) = q
∗
cc + αs
∗
cc (1)
x∗cc = y
∗
cc + z
∗
cc =
z∗cc
α
(2)
q∗cc + s
∗
cc = h
0
(z∗cc) (3)
q∗cc = c
0
(y∗cc) (4)
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• For the case of s∗cc = s
p (x∗cc) = q
∗
cc + αs (5)
x∗cc = y
∗
cc + z
∗
cc >
z∗cc
α
(6)
q∗cc + s = h
0
(z∗cc) (7)
q∗cc = c
0
(y∗cc) (8)
• For the case of s∗cc = s
p (x∗cc) = q
∗
cc + αs (9)
x∗cc = y
∗
cc + z
∗
cc <
z∗cc
α
(10)
q∗cc + s = h
0
(z∗cc) (11)
q∗cc = c
0
(y∗cc) (12)
The cc-equilibrium solution is illustrated for the case of s < s∗cc < s in
Figure1. The quantity constraint implied by the percentage requirement is seen
to drive a wedge equal to αs∗cc between the electricity price and the marginal
cost of electricity generation. The system thus involves a transfer of consumer-
and producer surplus from black electricity generation to a subsidy of green
electricity generation.
Figure 1 here
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3.2 Analysis
In the proposed GC-systems, the ”percentage requirement” is perceived as a
policy instrument aﬀecting the level of green electricity in end use consumption.
Unlike price-fixation (that leaves quantity an endogenous variable) or quantity
fixation (that leaves price an endogenous variable) the ”percentage requirement”
neither fixes price nor quantity and thus leaves both variables to be endogenously
determined. The following proposition shows that it is not in general true that
an increase of the ”percentage requirement” leads to an increased generation of
green electricity in equilibrium. It does, however, lead to a reduced generation
of black electricity, and therefore - from (4), (8) or (12) - a reduced wholesale
price of electricity. As the eﬀect on green electricity is indeterminate, the eﬀect
on total consumption and end user price is also indeterminate.7
Proposition 1 Under perfect competition in the electricity and the certificate
markets, the ”percentage requirement”, α, has the following eﬀects: i) if s <
s∗cc < s, then
dy∗cc
dα < 0 while sign
³
dz∗cc
dα
´
and sign
³
dx∗cc
dα
´
are indeterminate,
and ii) if s∗cc = s or s
∗
cc = s, then
dz∗cc
dα < 0,
dy∗cc
dα < 0,
dx∗cc
dα < 0.
Proof. i) Inserting (3) and (4) into (1) yields the electricity price as a
linear combination of marginal costs of the two groups of generation technolo-
gies in equilibrium, i.e. p (x∗cc) = (1− α) c
0
(y∗cc) + αh
0
(z∗cc). Take the im-
plicit derivatives of this expression with respect to α and arrive at:
dz∗cc
dα =
αs∗cc+x
∗
cc
h
(∂p/∂x)−(1−α)c
00
(y∗cc)
i
D ,
dy∗cc
dα =
(1−α)s∗cc+x
∗
cc
h
αh
00
(z∗cc)−(∂p/∂x)
i
D , and
dx∗cc
dα =
s∗cc+x
∗
cc
h
αh
00
(z∗cc)−(1−α)c
00
(y∗cc)
i
D , with D =
h
∂p
∂x − (1− α)
2 c
00
(y∗cc)− α2h
00
(z∗cc)
i
<
0. Inspection of signs verifies the above claims.
ii) Insert (8) in (7) or (12) in (11). Take the implicit derivative with re-
spect to α and get h
00
(z∗cc)
dz∗cc
dα = c
00
(y∗cc)
dy∗cc
dα . As marginal costs are assumed
increasing it follows: sign
dz∗cc
dα = sign
dy∗cc
dα = sign
dx∗cc
dα . The last equality fol-
lows as
dx∗cc
dα =
dz∗cc
dα +
dy∗cc
dα . But the signs cannot be non-negative. To see this
insert (8) in (5) and take the implicit derivative with respect to α to obtain
∂p
∂x
dx∗cc
dα = c
00
(y∗cc)
dy∗cc
dα + es, where es = s or s. As ∂p∂x < 0 we must have dx∗ccdα < 0
for this equation to hold. Hence, sign
dz∗cc
dα = sign
dy∗cc
dα = sign
dx∗cc
dα < 0 for this
case.
7This is a generalization of results obtained in Amundsen and Mortensen (2001, 2002). See
also Bye et al. (2002) and Jensen and Skytte (2002) that obtain more structure on the results
by applying specific functions on basically similar models as in Amundsen and Mortensen,
e.g. how total electricity consumption varies as a function of the percentage requirement.
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4 Market power in the generation of black elec-
tricity
We now look at the case where the producers of black electricity enjoy market
power. We assume that these producers act as a Nash Cournot (NC)-playing
oligopolist (or a perfectly co-ordinated cartel) facing the producers of green
electricity as a competitive fringe. We further assume that the NC-playing
producers of black electricity consider both the quantity of green electricity and
the number of GCs as given, represented by z. The producers of black electricity
will therefore in their generation decision also consider the simultaneous eﬀect
their quantity decision has on the price of GCs, because this price aﬀects the
wholesale price of electricity (q = p− αs). We are considering a one-shot game
so the NC-playing oligopolist will not be able to react on the response from
the producers of green electricity, i.e. the producers of black electricity are not
Stackelberg leaders. In the NC-equilibrium none of the producers will want to
change their quantity decision.
Again we are suppressing the subscripts indicating market form as we go
through the model specification. The NC-playing producers of black electricity
is faced with the following residual demand function for wholesale electricity:
q = q (x) = p (x)− αs (x) , where x = y + z,
and the following optimization problem:
MaxΠ (y, z) = q (x) y − c (y) .
In equilibrium the profit maximizing oligopolistic generator of black electric-
ity will therefore equate marginal revenue with marginal cost:
∂Π
∂y
=
∂q (x)
∂y
y + q − c
0
(y) = 0.
Or more precisely:
∂Π
∂y
=
·
∂p
∂x
− α∂s
∂y
¸
y + q − c
0
(y) = 0.
Observe that a marginal change of the generation of black electricity may
aﬀect the wholesale price through both the electricity market and the GC mar-
ket. The eﬀect through the electricity market is an ordinary eﬀect on consumer
price, while the eﬀect through the GC market stems from the induced change
of demand for certificates following from a marginal change in the generation
of black electricity (e.g. an increase in the generation of black electricity by
one unit will, in equilibrium, increase the demand of electricity by one unit and
the demand for certificates by α units). Considering the eﬀect of a marginal
change of demand on the price of GCs, α ∂s
∂y , this is clearly zero as long as the
certificate price is at one of the price bounds. For the case where the price of
GCs is within the interval the derivative of the certificate price does not exist as
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the marginal revenue is discontinuous at this point, see Figure 1. At this point
the total demand is equal to z
∗
α
, which is the only level of demand where we
actually get a certificate price within the price interval. A marginal change in
the demand of GCs from the allowable consumption level will drive the price of
GCs either to the lower bound (if the demand decreases) or to the upper bound
(if the demand increases). In equilibrium the consumers will never buy more
certificates than they actually need, they always buy an amount of certificates
equal to αx. So if the demand falls below z
∗
α
there is an excess supply of certifi-
cates and the certificate price reaches the lower bound. Similarly there will be
an excess demand for certificates if the demand for electricity increases above
the level z
∗
α
. An excess demand for certificates implies that the certificate price
reaches the upper bound.
4.1 mc-equilibrium
In the case of market power in the generation of black electricity we have the
following equilibrium solution for the key variables:
p (x∗mc) = q
∗
mc + αs
∗
mc (13)
x∗mc = y
∗
mc + z
∗
mc S
z∗mc
α
(14)
q∗mc + s
∗
mc = h
0
(z∗mc) (15)·
∂p (x∗mc)
∂x
− α∂s (x
∗
mc)
∂y
¸
y∗mc + q
∗
mc = c
0
(y∗mc) (16)
In equation (14), <, = and > refer to the cases s∗mc = s, s < s
∗
mc < s and
s∗mc = s, respectively. Note that (16) reduces to
∂p(x∗mc)
∂x y
∗
mc + q
∗
mc = c
0
(y∗mc) in
the cases of s∗cc = s and s
∗
cc = s, because, as argued above,
∂s(x∗mc)
∂y = 0 if the
GC-price is at one of the price bounds.
4.2 Analysis
We will now compare the mc-equilibrium with the cc-equilibrium. We will do
this by looking at three diﬀerent cases. The cases will diﬀer with respect to
whether the price of the GCs in the competitive case is at one of the price
bounds or if it is within the price interval. In each of the cases we identify
the cc-equilibrium and consider the eﬀect of introducing market power in the
generation of black electricity. The main results are highlighted in Proposition
2 and 3.
Proposition 2 shows that market power in the generation of black electricity
may eﬀectively distort the functioning of the GC-system and transform it to a
system of tax based subsidies. The GC-price will never be established at an
intermediate level. It may, however, be established at the upper price bound.
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Proposition 2 Assume the producers of black electricity act as a NC-playing
oligopolist (or a perfectly co-ordinated cartel) facing green producers as a com-
petitive fringe, then - in equilibrium - there will i) never be established an in-
termediate certificate price such that s < s∗mc < s, but ii) there may be an
equilibrium certificate price at the lower or the upper price bound, i.e. s∗mc = s
or s∗mc = s.
Proof. i) To show that we cannot have s < s∗mc < s, assume yˆ is a solution
satisfying the first order conditions for the producers of black electricity and that
yˆ+ z = z
α
where z is the quantity of green electricity that the producers of black
electricity, in accordance with the NC-assumption, consider as given. Clearly,
if y < yˆ, then s∗mc = s, due to excess supply of certificates (i.e. z > α (y + z))
and if y > yˆ, then s∗mc = s, due to excess demand for certificates. Denote
the marginal revenue function, g (y, z), by g (y, z) = ∂q
∂yy + q. Observe that
g (y, z) = ∂p
∂xy + q for y 6= yˆ as ∂s∂y = 0 for such values. Clearly, g (y, z)
is discontinuous at yˆ as lim
y→yˆ−
g (y, z) = ∂p
∂x yˆ + qˆ
− and lim
y→yˆ+
g (y, z) = ∂p
∂x yˆ +
qˆ+ where qˆ− = lim
y→yˆ−
q = p (yˆ + z) − αs and qˆ+ = lim
y→yˆ+
q = p (yˆ + z) − αs.
However, as Π (yˆ, z) = qyˆ − c (yˆ), profit maximization will lead the producers
of black electricity to secure qˆ− (by an infinitesimal quantity reduction of black
electricity) implying the corner solution, i.e. s∗mc = s. An example is illustrated
in Figure 2.
ii) To show that the GC-price may be at either the upper or the lower price
bound, it suﬃces to give examples satisfying the assumptions of the model. Ex-
amples are provided in appendix B and illustrated in Figure 3 and 4.
In Figure 2, 3 and 4 we have illustrated the profit curves of the NC-playing
producers of black electricity for three possible equilibrium solutions of the
model. Figure 2 helps illustrating the point made in Proposition 2 i), that there
will neve be established an intermediate GC-price in the mc-case. In Figure 3,
the equilibrium certificate price is at the lower price bound, while in Figure 4
the price of GCs in equilibrium is established at the upper price bound. The
figures are based on a simple numerical model satisfying the assumptions we
have made about the electricity market. The model is specified in Appendix
A. The specific parameter values and solutions of the model illustrated in the
figures are presented in Appendix B. In the figures, the profit curves are illus-
trated assuming that the NC-playing producers consider both the quantity of
green electricity and the number of GCs as given. Fixing the quantity of green
electricity at the equilibrium levels, we then draw the profit curve for diﬀerent
quantities of black electricity. Under the assumption of Cournot behavior, the
oligopolistic producers of black electricity choose the quantity of black electric-
ity that maximizes profit. The equilibrium quantity of black electricity is thus
found where the profit curve is at its maximum. Looking at the figures, we
notice that the profit drops discontinuously at a specific value of y. This is
the quantity of black electricity at which total consumption of electricity is at
the allowable consumption level, i.e. we get a market based price of the GCs.
For lower values of y, there is an excess supply of GCs, i.e. the GC-price is at
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the lower price bound. If the generation of black electricity increases above the
point where the profit curve drops, total consumption is above the allowable
consumption level and the certificate price jumps to the upper price bound.
In the numerical example behind Figure 2, the model generates an interme-
diate GC-price. However, the NC-playing producers of black electricity will not
stay at the allowable consumption level implied by the intermediate GC-price.
The profit curve shows that profit maximization will lead to an infinitesimal
reduction in the quantity of black electricity from the allowable consumption
level, inducing s∗mc = s. Hence, Figure 2 ilustrates the point made in the formal
proof above. In Figure 3 the profit curve has a global maximum at the left of
the allowable consumption level. We will therefore get an equilibrium GC-price
at the lower price bound. In Figure 4, however, the global maximum is to the
right of this point, i.e. the GC-price is at the upper price bound.
Figure 2, 3 and 4 here
The following proposition shows that market power exercised by the pro-
ducers of black electricity may actually lead to an increase of the generation
of green power, as compared with the competitive equilibrium, and that this
is definitely true if the competitive equilibrium GC-price is at its lower bound.
The generation of black electricity will, however, always decrease compared with
the competitive equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Under the assumptions of the model: i) if s∗cc = s then z
∗
mc >
z∗cc, ii) if s
∗
cc > s then sign (z
∗
mc − z∗cc) is indeterminate and iii) y∗mc < y∗cc.
Proof. i) To obtain a contradiction, assume z∗mc ≤ z∗cc. ¿From (11) and
(15) we have: h
0
(z∗cc) = q
∗
cc + s ≥ q∗mc + s∗mc = h
0
(z∗mc), implying q
∗
cc ≥ q∗mc.
From (12) and (16): q∗cc = c
0
(y∗cc) ≥ c
0
(y∗mc)− ∂p∂xy∗mc = q∗mc. Hence, y∗cc > y∗mc.
So that x∗cc = y
∗
cc + z
∗
cc > x
∗
mc = z
∗
mc + y
∗
mc and p (x
∗
cc) < p (x
∗
mc). How-
ever, successive substitution from the two sets of first order conditions yields:
p (x∗cc) = (1− α) q∗cc + αh
0
(z∗cc) and p (x
∗
mc) = (1− α) q∗mc + αh
0
(z∗mc). As
q∗cc ≥ q∗mc and z∗cc ≥ z∗mc, this clearly gives p (x∗cc) ≥ p (x∗mc); a contradiction.
Hence, we must have z∗mc > z
∗
cc.
ii) Examples satisfying the assumptions of the model are provided in appendix
C.
iii) To obtain a contradiction, assume y∗mc ≥ y∗cc. Then from (4) (or (8) or
(12)) and (16), q∗mc > q
∗
cc. We now consider each possible case with respect to
the value of s∗cc for the cc-equilibrium.
Assume first s∗cc = s. Then, as q
∗
mc > q
∗
cc and s
∗
mc ≥ s, we have from (9) and
(13) that p (x∗mc) = q
∗
mc + αs
∗
mc > p (x
∗
cc) = q
∗
cc + αs. However, from (11) and
(15) we have h
0
(z∗cc) = q
∗
cc+s < q
∗
mc+s
∗
mc = h
0
(z∗mc) so that z
∗
mc > z
∗
cc. Hence,
as by assumption y∗mc ≥ y∗cc, we must have x∗mc = y∗mc + z∗mc > y∗cc + z∗cc = x∗cc
so that p (x∗mc) < p (x
∗
cc). That contradicts the above assumption that p (x
∗
mc) <
p (x∗cc). Hence, y
∗
mc < y
∗
cc as s
∗
cc = s.
Next, assume s∗cc > s. Consider first the possibility that s
∗
mc = s. Then,
using the same line of reasoning as above, we get p (x∗mc) = q
∗
mc+αs > p (x
∗
cc) =
12
q∗cc + αs
∗
cc, and h
0
(z∗cc) = q
∗
cc + s
∗
cc < q
∗
mc + s = h
0
(z∗mc) so that z
∗
mc > z
∗
cc,
x∗mc > x
∗
cc and the contradicting result that p (x
∗
mc) < p (x
∗
cc).
It remains to consider the case where s∗cc > s and s
∗
mc = s. As s
∗
cc > s,
we must have
z∗cc
z∗cc+y
∗
cc
≤ α or (1− α) z∗cc ≤ αy∗cc, and, furthermore, as s∗mc = s
we must have (1− α) z∗mc > αy∗mc. Then, as by assumption y∗mc ≥ y∗cc, we
have (1− α) z∗cc < αy∗cc ≤ αy∗mc < (1− α) z∗mc, so that z∗mc > z∗cc. Hence,
x∗mc = y
∗
mc + z
∗
mc > y
∗
cc + z
∗
cc = x
∗
cc, so that p (x
∗
mc) < p (x
∗
cc). However, suc-
cessive substitutions from the two sets of first order conditions yield: p (x∗mc) =
(1− α) q∗mc + αh
0
(z∗mc) and p (x
∗
cc) = (1− α) q∗cc + αh
0
(z∗cc). As q
∗
mc > q
∗
cc and
z∗mc > z
∗
cc we have p (x
∗
mc) > p (x
∗
cc), that contradicts the above conclusion.
Hence, we arrive at the final conclusion that y∗mc < y
∗
cc.
Compared to the perfect competition equilibrium, market power in the gen-
eration of black electricity will always reduce the generation of black electricity
(as shown in proposition 3 iii)) and increase the wholesale price of electricity.
Even (as stated in Proposition 3 i) and ii)) if the green electricity producers
may increase their generation, it can be shown that this increase will never
fully compensate for the reduction in generation of black electricity. Thus, total
quantity of electricity generated will decrease. This leads unambiguously to an
increased end-user price and lower consumption. The market power obviously
makes the producers of black electricity better oﬀ as they are able to increase
their profit as oligopolists (or a cartel) as compared with the competitive solu-
tion, and the consumers will always be the losers in this situation due to lower
consumption and higher price. Whether the producers of green electricity will
gain or loose compared with a competitive market will, however, depend on
the price of GCs that would be generated in a competitive market. As stated
by Proposition 3 ii), introduction of market power in the generation of black
electricity can actually increase the generation of green electricity also in the
cases where the competitive market generates a certificate price at the upper
bound, s∗cc = s, or within the price interval. However, the eﬀect on the green
producers’ profits is not certain. For the case of s∗cc = s, the crucial point
is whether the equilibrium quantity reduces below the allowable consumption
level, x = z
∗
α
. Above this level, we will not get any change in the certificate price
as it will stay at the upper bound. In this case the green producers will benefit
from the black electricity generator’s market power. Such a case is illustrated
in Figure 4. If, however, the equilibrium quantity reduces below the allowable
consumption level, as illustrated in Figure 3, the certificate price will jump to
the lower bound. The green producers are then facing a lower certificate price
and a higher wholesale price of electricity. The eﬀect on their profit is indeter-
minate. In the case where the perfect competition equilibrium quantity is at the
allowable consumption level the certificate price is decided in the market and
is within the price interval. As stated in proposition 2 above and illustrated
in Figure 2, the oligopolistic generator of black electricity will never want to
stay at this generation level. The producers of green electricity will then face a
reduced certificate price and an increased wholesale price of electricity. Again
the total eﬀect on the green producers’ profits will be indeterminate.
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5 Market power in the generation of green elec-
tricity
In this section we consider a NC-playing oligopolistic generator of green electric-
ity (or a perfectly co-ordinated cartel) facing a competitive fringe of producers
of black electricity. The NC assumption is here implying that the producers of
green electricity consider the quantity of black electricity as given (represented
below as y) when making decisions as to how much green electricity to generate
and how many GC’s to sell in the certificate market. As NC-players, the pro-
ducers of green electricity will recognize that the certificate price will be aﬀected
by the number of certificates they sell in the GC market. Therefore they will
consider if it can be profitable to hold back some of the certificates they gen-
erate. To be able to separate the number of certificates sold from the number
of certificates generated we introduce a variable w representing the former (z is
still representing the number of generated certificates). The profit maximizing
generator of green electricity then maximizes the following objective function:
MaxΠ (z,w, y) = qz + sw − h (z) , s.t. w ≤ z.
We consider two cases: a) w = z and b) w < z:
a) First order condition:
∂Π
∂z
=
∂ (q + s)
∂z
z + q + s− h
0
(z) = 0.
Or more precisely:
∂Π
∂z
=
·
∂p
∂x
+ (1− α) ∂s
∂z
¸
z + q + s− h
0
(z) = 0.
b) First order conditions:
∂Π
∂z
=
∂q
∂z
z + q +
∂s
∂z
w − h
0
(z) = 0 and
∂Π
∂w
=
∂q
∂w
z +
∂s
∂w
w + s = 0.
5.1 cm-equilibrium
We have then the following equilibrium solution for the key variables in case a),
i.e. z = w:
p (x∗cm) = q
∗
cm + αs
∗
cm (17)
x∗cm = y
∗
cm + z
∗
cm S
z∗cm
α
(18)
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·
∂p (x∗cm)
∂x
+ (1− α) ∂s (x
∗
cm)
∂z
¸
z∗cm + q
∗
cm + s
∗
cm = h
0
(z∗cm) (19)
q∗cm = c
0
(y∗cm) (20)
As in the specification of the mc-equilibrium, the operators <, = and > in
equation (18) refer to the cases s∗cm = s, s < s
∗
cm < s and s
∗
cm = s, respectively.
Note that (19) reduces to
∂p(x∗cm)
∂x z
∗
cm + q
∗
cm + s
∗
cm = h
0
(z∗cm) in the cases of
s∗cm = s and s
∗
cm = s.
5.2 Analysis
As will be shown in proposition 5, it will never be profitable for the producers of
green electricity to hold back some of the generated certificates from the market.
We will therefore not go into detail about the equilibrium solution of the case
where w < z, but rather concentrate on the main results from case a). These
are highlighted in Proposition 4,5 and 6.
Proposition 4 shows that the result regarding non-existence of intermediate
certificate prices carries over from the mc-equilibrium to the case of co-ordinated
oligopolistic behavior of the producers of green electricity.
Proposition 4 Assume the producers of green electricity act as a NC-playing
oligopolist (or a perfectly co-ordinated cartel) facing a competitive fringe of pro-
ducers of black electricity, then - in equilibrium - there will i) never be established
an intermediate certificate price such that s < s∗cm < s, but ii) there may be an
equilibrium certificate price at the lower or the upper price bound, i.e. s∗cm = s
or s∗cm = s.
Proof. i) To show that we cannot have s < s∗cm < s, assume zˆ and wˆ, with
wˆ ≤ zˆ, satisfy the optimality conditions for the producers of green electricity
and that y+ zˆ = wˆ
α
where y is the quantity of black electricity that the producers
of green electricity, in accordance with the NC-assumption, consider as given.
We consider two cases: a) wˆ < zˆ and b) wˆ = zˆ.
a) Clearly, if z < zˆ (for given values of y and wˆ) then s∗cm = s, due to
excess supply of certificates (i.e. wˆ > α (y + z)) and if z > zˆ, then s∗cm = s,
due to excess demand for certificates. Denote the marginal revenue function,
g (z, y, wˆ), by g (z, y, wˆ) = ∂q
∂z z +
∂s
∂z wˆ + q. Observe that g (z, y, wˆ) =
∂p
∂xz + q
for z 6= zˆ as ∂s
∂z = 0 for such values. Clearly, g (z, y, wˆ) is discontinuous at
zˆ as lim
z→zˆ−
g (z, y, wˆ) = ∂p
∂x zˆ + qˆ
− and lim
z→zˆ+
g (z, y, wˆ) = ∂p
∂x zˆ + qˆ
+ where qˆ− =
lim
z→ˆz−
q = p (y + zˆ)− αs and qˆ+ = lim
z→ˆz+
q = p (y + zˆ)− αs. The profit function
is Π (zˆ, y, wˆ) = qzˆ + swˆ − h (zˆ). Rewrite this as Π (zˆ, y, wˆ) = p (y + zˆ) zˆ +
s (wˆ − αzˆ)−h (zˆ) and observe that the assumption of y+ zˆ = wˆ
α
implies wˆ > αzˆ.
Hence, profit maximization will lead the producers of green electricity to secure
qˆ+ (by an infinitesimal quantity increase of green electricity) implying the corner
solution s∗cm = s.
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b) In this case y + zˆ = zˆ
α
. Clearly, if z < zˆ, then s∗cm = s, due to excess
demand for certificates (i.e. z < α (y + z)) and if z > zˆ, then s∗cm = s, due to
excess supply of certificates. Denote the marginal revenue function, g (z, y), by
g (z, y) =
³
∂(q+s)
∂z
´
z + q + s. Observe that g (z, y) = ∂p
∂xz + q + s for z 6= zˆ as
∂s
∂y = 0 for such values. Clearly, g (z, y) is discontinuous at zˆ as lim
z→zˆ−
g (z, y) =
∂p
∂x zˆ+qˆ
−+s and lim
z→zˆ+
g (z, y) = ∂p
∂x zˆ+qˆ
++s where qˆ− = lim
z→ˆz−
q = p (y + zˆ)−αs
and qˆ+ = lim
z→ˆz+
q = p (y + zˆ)−αs. However, as Π (zˆ, y) = (q + s) zˆ−h (zˆ), profit
maximization will lead the producers of green electricity to secure qˆ− (by an
infinitesimal quantity reduction of green electricity) implying the corner solution
s∗cm = s.
ii) To show that the GC-price may be at either the upper or the lower price
bound, it suﬃces to give examples satisfying the assumptions of the model. Ex-
amples are provided in appendix D and illustrated in Figure 5 and 6.
As in the mc-case we will illustrate two possible equilibrium solutions for
the GC-price, one at the lower price bound and one at the upper price bound.
In Figure 5 and 6 we have illustrated the profit curves of the producers of green
electricity for two sets of assumed parameter values. The numerical examples
behind the figures are presented in Appendix D. In the figures, the profit curves
are illustrated assuming that the NC-playing producers of green electricity con-
sider the quantity of black electricity as given. Fixing the quantity of black
electricity at the equilibrium level and varying the quantity of green electric-
ity, produces the profit curves illustrated in Figure 5 and 6. Again the profit
curves drop discontinuously at the point of the allowable consumption level. As
opposed to the mc-case, quantity levels below the allowable consumption level
will in the cm-case generate a GC-price at the upper price bound. For such
low quantities of green electricity, there will be an excess demand for GCs. For
higher quantities of green electricity, the GC-price is at the lower bound. As
the profit curve in Figure 5 has its global maximum at the right of the allow-
able consumption level, the GC-price in equilibrium is at the lower price bound.
Figure 6, on the other hand, illustrates an equilibrium GC-price at the upper
price bound. As in the mc-case, the drop in the profit curves illustrates that an
interior GC-price will not be an equilibrium.
Figure 5 and 6 here
Proposition 5 shows that the producers of green electricity will never sell
less certificates than they generate. Intuitively, the relationship between the
number of certificates sold and the equilibrium solution is disconnected when
the generator of green electricity act as a NC-oligopolist. Hence, selling an
additional certificate has no influence on the market equilibrium and only adds
to the profit.
Proposition 5 Assume the producers of green electricity act as a NC-playing
oligopolist (or a perfectly co-ordinated cartel) facing a competitive fringe of pro-
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ducers of black electricity, then - in equilibrium - it will never pay to sell less
certificates than the amount generated. Formally, we must have w∗cm = z
∗
cm.
Proof. To obtain a contradiction, assume w∗cm < z
∗
cm in equilibrium. We
know the equilibrium implies either s∗cm = s or s
∗
cm = s and that the number of
certificates is not binding, i.e. w∗cm 6= α (y∗cm + z∗cm). Consider the above first
order condition ∂Π
∂w =
∂q
∂wz +
∂s
∂ww + s = 0. As s
∗
cm is at either the lower or the
upper price bound and the number of certificates is not binding we must have
∂q
∂w = 0 and
∂s
∂w = 0, such that
∂Π
∂w = s > 0. Hence, profits may be increased by
selling all the certificates.
Market power among the producers of green electricity necessarily leads to a
reduction of green electricity generation. However, Proposition 6 shows that the
generation of black electricity may increase as compared with the competitive
equilibrium and that this is definitely true if the competitive equilibrium GC-
price is at its upper bound.
Proposition 6 Under the assumptions of the model: i) z∗cm < z
∗
cc ii) if s
∗
cc = s
then y∗cm > y
∗
cc and iii) if s
∗
cc < s then sign (y
∗
cm − y∗cc) is indeterminate.
Proof. i) To obtain a contradiction, assume z∗cm ≥ z∗cc. We consider each
possible case with respect to the value of s∗cc for the cc-equilibrium.
Assume first s∗cc = s. Then, as by assumption, z
∗
cm ≥ z∗cc and s∗cm ≤ s∗cc,
we have from (7) and (19) q∗cm = h
0
(z∗cm) − s∗cm − dpdxz∗cm > h
0
(z∗cc) − s = q∗cc.
By successive substitutions from the two sets of first order conditions we arrive
at p (x∗cm) = (1− α) q∗cm + α
h
h
0
(z∗cm)− dpdxz
∗
cm
i
and p (x∗cc) = (1− α) q∗cc +
αh
0
(z∗cc). As z
∗
cm ≥ z∗cc and q∗cm > q∗cc, we have p (x∗cm) > p (x∗cc). However,
using (8) and (20) we get c
0
(y∗cm) = q
∗
cm > q
∗
cc = c
0
(y∗cc) so that y
∗
cm > y
∗
cc.
Consequently, x∗cm = y
∗
cm + z
∗
cm > y
∗
cc + z
∗
cc = x
∗
cc, so that p (x
∗
cm) < p (x
∗
cc).
This contradicts the above conclusion that p (x∗cm) > p (x
∗
cc). Hence, we must
have z∗cm < z
∗
cc as s
∗
cc = s.
Next, assume s∗cc < s. Consider first the possibility that s
∗
cm = s. We follow
the same line of reasoning as above to arrive at q∗cm > q
∗
cc, as we have from (3),
(11) and (19) that q∗cm = h
0
(z∗cm)−s− dpdxz∗cm > h
0
(z∗cc)−s∗cc = q∗cc. Furthermore,
by successive substitutions from the two sets of first order conditions we arrive
at p (x∗cm) = (1− α) q∗cm + α
h
h
0
(z∗cm)− dpdxz∗cm
i
and p (x∗cc) = (1− α) q∗cc +
αh
0
(z∗cc). Inspection of signs yields p (x
∗
cm) > p (x
∗
cc). However, using (4), (12)
and (20) we get c
0
(y∗cm) = q
∗
cm > q
∗
cc = c
0
(y∗cc) so that y
∗
cm > y
∗
cc. Consequently,
x∗cm = y
∗
cm + z
∗
cm > y
∗
cc + z
∗
cc = x
∗
cc, so that p (x
∗
cm) < p (x
∗
cc). This contradicts
the above conclusion that p (x∗cm) > p (x
∗
cc).
It remains to consider the case where s∗cc < s and s
∗
cm = s. As s
∗
cc < s
we must have (1− α) z∗cc ≥ αy∗cc, and, furthermore, as s∗cm = s we must have
αy∗cm > (1− α) z∗cm. Then, as by assumption, z∗cm ≥ z∗cc we have αy∗cm >
(1− α) z∗cm ≥ (1− α) z∗cc ≥ αy∗cc, so that y∗cm > y∗cc. Hence, x∗cm = y∗cm+ z∗cm >
y∗cc + z
∗
cc = x
∗
cc, such that p (x
∗
cm) < p (x
∗
cc). However, using (4), (12) and
(20) we get q∗cm = c
0
(y∗cm) > c
0
(y∗cc) = q
∗
cc. From the following expressions
(derived above): p (x∗cm) = (1− α) q∗cm + α
h
h
0
(z∗cm)− dpdxz
∗
cm
i
and p (x∗cc) =
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(1− α) q∗cc + αh
0
(z∗cc), we are forced to conclude that p (x
∗
cm) > p (x
∗
cc), that
contradicts the above conclusion that p (x∗cm) < p (x
∗
cc).
Hence, we arrive at the final conclusion that z∗cm < z
∗
cc for all cases.
ii) To obtain a contradiction, assume y∗cc ≥ y∗cm. ¿From (8) and (20) we
have q∗cc ≥ q∗cm, and from (5) and (17) we have p (x∗cc) ≥ p (x∗mc), which implies
x∗cc ≤ x∗cm. Then from (6) and (18) we have y∗cc+z∗cc ≤ y∗cm+z∗cm. As y∗cm ≤ y∗cc,
by assumption, we have z∗cm ≥ z∗cc that is proven to be wrong in i). Hence, we
must have y∗cm > y
∗
cc.
iii) Examples satisfying the assumptions of the model are provided in ap-
pendix E.
Market power in the generation of green electricity always induces reduced
generation of green electricity and a higher end user price, as compared with
the competitive case. The producers of green electricity will always earn a
higher profit in the case where they enjoy market power as compared with
the cc-equilibrium. On the other hand, also the producers of black electricity
may be better oﬀ than in the competitive case, and this will always be so in
the case of s∗cc = s. The reason is that the wholesale price of electricity will
increase in the cm-equilibrium in the case of s∗cc = s, as the generation of black
electricity increases compared with the competitive solution. However, the eﬀect
on the wholesale price in the two other cases, i.e. s∗cc = s and s < s
∗
cc < s, is
inconclusive because of the indeterminacy of the change in the generation of
black electricity. Therefore the eﬀect on the profit of the producers of black
electricity is indeterminate in these cases.
6 Market power in the generation of both black
and green electricity
In this section we will assume that there is market power in both generation
technologies. We will therefore have a market in which both the producers of
black and green electricity act as NC-playing oligopolists.
The optimization problems for the producers of black and green electric-
ity are identical to the mc-case and the cm-case, respectively. This gives the
following first order condition for the NC-playing producers of black electricity:
∂Π
∂y
=
·
∂p
∂x
− α∂s
∂y
¸
y + q − c
0
(y) = 0.
For the profit maximizing generator of green electricity we consider two
cases: a) w = z and b) w < z:
a) First order condition:
∂Π
∂z
=
·
∂p
∂x
+ (1− α) ∂s
∂z
¸
z + q + s− h
0
(z) = 0.
b) First order conditions:
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∂Π
∂z
=
∂q
∂z
z + q +
∂s
∂z
w − h
0
(z) = 0 and
∂Π
∂w
=
∂q
∂w
z +
∂s
∂w
w + s = 0.
6.1 mm-equilibrium
We have then the following equilibrium solution for the key variables in case a),
i.e. z = w:
p (x∗mm) = q
∗
mm + αs
∗
mm (21)
x∗mm = y
∗
mm + z
∗
mm S
z∗mm
α
(22)
·
∂p (x∗mm)
∂x
+ (1− α) ∂s (x
∗
mm)
∂z
¸
z∗mm + q
∗
mm + s
∗
mm = h
0
(z∗mm) (23)
·
∂p (x∗mm)
∂x
− α∂s (x
∗
mm)
∂y
¸
y∗mm + q
∗
mm = c
0
(y∗mm) (24)
Again, <, = and > in equation (22) refer to the cases s∗mm = s, s < s
∗
mm < s
and s∗mm = s, respectively. For the cases of s
∗
mm = s and s
∗
mm = s, we have
∂s(x∗mm)
∂z =
∂s(x∗mm)
∂y = 0. Thus, (23) (24) are reduced to
∂p(x∗mm)
∂x z
∗
mm + q
∗
mm +
s∗mm = h
0
(z∗mm) and
∂p(x∗mm)
∂x y
∗
mm + q
∗
mm = c
0
(y∗mm), respectively.
6.2 Analysis
As in the preceding section, it will be shown (Proposition 7) that it will never
be profitable for the producers of green electricity to hold back some of the
generated certificates from the market. We concentrate therefore on the main
results from case a). These are highlighted proposition 7 and 8.
Proposition 7 shows that, like in the mc- and cm-equilibrium, the certificate
market collapses in the sense that the GC-price will never be established at an
intermediate level. It may, however, be established at the upper price bound.
We further show that again it will not be profitable for the producers of green
electricity to utilize their market power to hold back some of the certificates
they generate.
Proposition 7 Assume both the producers of black and green electricity act as
a NC-playing oligopolists, then - in equilibrium - there will i) never be established
an intermediate certificate price such that s < s∗mm < s, but ii) there may be an
equilibrium certificate price at the lower or the upper price bound, i.e. s∗mm = s
or s∗mm = s. Furthermore, we have iii) w
∗
mm = z
∗
mm.
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Proof. i) The proof follows the same line of reasoning as in the mc- and
cm-equilibrium above.
ii) To show that the GC-price may be at either the upper or the lower price
bound, it suﬃces to give examples satisfying the assumptions of the model. Ex-
amples are provided in appendix F. An illustration of a possible equilibrium is
provided in Figure 7.
iii) The proof for w∗mm = z
∗
mm is following the same line of reasoning as in
the proof for proposition 5.
In Figure 7 we have illustrated a possible equilibrium solution of the numer-
ical model specified in Appendix A. Figure 7 shows the best response curves for
the two types of producers in the mm-case for an equilibrium solution with the
GC-price at the lower price bound. The figure is based on the example speci-
fied in the first part of Appendix F. The best response curve for the producers
of green electricity, R (y), is found by fixing the quantity of black electricity
at diﬀerent levels and then identifying the profit maximizing quantity of green
electricity at each of these levels. The best response curve for the producers
of black electricity, R (z), is produced in the same way, except that we then
fix the quantity of green electricity. The equilibrium quantities of black and
green electricity is found at the intersection of the best response curves, which
confirms the NC-equilibrium solution presented in Appendix F for the assumed
parameter values.
Figure 7 here
Proposition 8 states that in the case of market power in both generation tech-
nologies the development of the output levels of both black and green electricity
is indeterminate as compared with the competitive solution.
Proposition 8 Under the assumptions of the model we have that
sign (y∗mm − y∗cc) and sign (z∗mm − z∗cc) are both indeterminate, irrespective
of whether s < s∗cc < s, s
∗
cc = s or s
∗
cc = s.
Proof. It suﬃces to give examples satisfying the assumptions of the model.
Examples are provided in appendix G.
As stated in proposition 8, market power in both generation technologies
implies an uncertain eﬀect on the generation of both black and green electric-
ity as compared with the competitive solution. However, the end user price
increases as total generation decreases. Both types of producers will use their
market power to increase their profits. The eﬀect on the certificate price is
indeterminate, except that, as stated in Proposition 7, it will never be realized
an interior certificate price in equilibrium.
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7 Market power in the joint generation of green
and black electricity
In this section we will assume that there is only one generator of electricity.
This generator will be able to generate from both renewable and non-renewable
sources. The objective function for this generator is:
MaxΠ (z, w, y) = q (z + y) + sw − h (z)− c (y) , s.t. w ≤ z.
We consider two cases: a) w = z and b) w < z:
a) First order conditions:
∂Π
∂z
=
∂ (q + s)
∂z
x+ q + s− h
0
(z) = 0 and
∂Π
∂y
=
∂q
∂y
x+ q − c
0
(z) = 0.
Or more precisely:
∂Π
∂z
=
·
∂p
∂x
+ (1− α) ∂s
∂z
¸
x+ q + s− h
0
(z) = 0 and
∂Π
∂y
=
·
∂p
∂x
− α∂s
∂y
¸
x+ q − c
0
(y) = 0.
b) First order conditions:
∂Π
∂z
=
∂q
∂z
x+ q +
∂s
∂z
w − h
0
(z) = 0,
∂Π
∂y
=
∂q
∂y
x+ q +
∂s
∂y
w − c
0
(y) = 0 and
∂Π
∂w
=
∂q
∂w
x+
∂s
∂w
w + s = 0.
7.1 M-equilibrium
We have then the following equilibrium solution for the key variables in case a),
i.e. z = w:
p (x∗M ) = q
∗
M + αs
∗
M (25)
x∗M = y
∗
M + z
∗
M S
z∗M
α
(26)·
∂p (x∗M )
∂x
+ (1− α) ∂s (x
∗
M )
∂z
¸
x∗M + q
∗
M + s
∗
M = h
0
(z∗M ) (27)
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·
∂p (x∗M )
∂x
− α∂s (x
∗
M )
∂y
¸
x∗M + q
∗
M = c
0
(y∗M ) (28)
In equation (26), the operators <, = and > refer to the cases s∗M = s,
s < s∗M < s and s
∗
M = s, respectively. Remember that, (27) and (28) are
reduced to
∂p(x∗M )
∂x x
∗
M + q
∗
M + s
∗
M = h
0
(z∗M ) and
∂p(x∗M )
∂x x
∗
M + q
∗
M = c
0
(y∗M ),
respectively, in the cases of s∗M = s and s
∗
M = s.
7.2 Analysis
As will be shown below, it will never be profitable for the generator to hold back
some of the generated certificates from the market. We will therefore not go
into detail about the equilibrium solution of the case where w < z, but rather
concentrate on the main results from case a). We highlight these results in
Proposition 9 and 10. Proposition 9 shows that although there does not exist
intermediate equilibrium certificate prices in any of the preceding cases of market
power, there will indeed exist such prices when there is joint (monopolistic)
market power for black and green electricity producers.
Proposition 9 Assume the producers have both green and black technologies at
their disposal and act as a monopolist, then - in equilibrium - a certificate price
may be established at i) an intermediate level, i.e. s < s∗M < s or ii) either of
the price bounds, i.e. s∗M = s or s
∗
M = s. Furthermore, we have iii) w
∗
M = z
∗
M .
Proof. i) To show that there may be interior certificate prices, s < s∗M < s,
it suﬃces to give an example. This is provided in Appendix H. The essential
reason for the existence of such interior prices is that the monopolist is indif-
ferent with respect to securing the high, the low or some intermediate certificate
price (and correspondingly for the wholesale price) for the case where the op-
timal solution satisfies xˆ = yˆ + zˆ = wˆ
α
with wˆ ≤ zˆ. To see this, consider the
profit function for the monopolist Π (zˆ, yˆ, wˆ) = qxˆ+swˆ−c (yˆ)−h (zˆ). This may
be rewritten: Π (zˆ, yˆ, wˆ) = pxˆ + (wˆ − αxˆ) s− c (yˆ) − h (zˆ). However, as xˆ = wˆ
α
the profit function reduces to Π (zˆ, yˆ, wˆ) = pxˆ − c (yˆ) − h (zˆ). Hence, the value
of s does not matter. Intuitively, a larger certificate price is exactly oﬀset by a
smaller wholesale price for this case.
ii) To show that there may be a GC-price at either the upper or the lower
price bound, it suﬃces to give examples satisfying the assumptions of the model.
Examples are provided in appendix H.
iii) The proof for w∗M = z
∗
M is following the same line of reasoning as in the
proof for proposition 5.
As observed in Proposition 9, the profit function for the monopolist reduces
to Π (z, w, y) = p (x)x − c (y) − h (z) as s < s∗M < s. Hence, the first order
condition for the monopolist reads p+ ∂p
∂xx = c
0
(y) = h
0
(z), i.e. just as for any
other multiplant monopolist. In the case of a market based GC-price, there are
no subsidies paid by the state and it is interesting to note that the monopolist
does not itself subsidize its own expensive green technology.
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Proposition 10 Under the assumptions of the model: y∗M < y
∗
cc and z
∗
M < z
∗
cc.
Proof. The proposition is proved by considering the following complete set
of cases: a) s∗cc = s, b) s
∗
cc = s c) s < s
∗
cc < s
a) To obtain a contradiction, assume y∗M ≥ y∗cc. Substitute (12) into (11)
and (28) into (27) to obtain s = h
0
(z∗cc) − c
0
(y∗cc) ≤ h
0
(z∗M ) − c
0
(y∗M ) = s
∗
M .
As y∗M ≥ y∗cc, we must have z∗M ≥ z∗cc, so that x∗M ≥ x∗cc and p (x∗M ) ≤ p (x∗cc).
However, successive substitution of the two sets of equilibrium conditions yields
p (x∗M ) = (1− α) c
0
(y∗M ) + αh
0
(z∗M ) −
∂p
∂xx
∗
M and p (x
∗
cc) = (1− α) c
0
(y∗cc) +
αh
0
(z∗cc). Using z
∗
M ≥ z∗cc and y∗M ≥ y∗cc clearly gives p (x∗M ) > p (x∗cc) that
contradicts the above result. Hence, we have y∗M < y
∗
cc. Next, we show z
∗
M < z
∗
cc.
As s∗cc = s, we must have (1− α) z∗cc > αy∗cc. Consider the possibility that
s∗M > s (we consider s
∗
M = s below). If this is to be the case, then αy
∗
M ≥
(1− α) z∗M so that (1− α) z∗cc > αy∗cc > αy∗M ≥ (1− α) z∗M . Hence, we must
have z∗M < z
∗
cc. It remains to show the case of s
∗
M = s. Substitute (12) into (11)
and (28) into (27) to obtain s∗cc = s = h
0
(z∗cc) − c
0
(y∗cc) = h
0
(z∗M ) − c
0
(y∗M ) =
s = s∗M . Clearly, y
∗
M < y
∗
cc implies z
∗
M < z
∗
cc. This completes the proof of case
a).
b) To obtain a contradiction, assume z∗M ≥ z∗cc. Substitute (8) into (7) and
(28) into (27) to obtain s = h
0
(z∗cc)−c
0
(y∗cc) ≥ h
0
(z∗M )−c
0
(y∗M ) = s
∗
M . Clearly,
z∗M ≥ z∗cc implies y∗M ≥ y∗cc so that x∗M ≥ x∗cc and p (x∗M ) ≤ p (x∗cc). From here
on the proof follows the last part of the proof under a). Hence, we must have
z∗M < z
∗
cc. Next, we show y
∗
M < y
∗
cc for this case.
As s∗cc = s, we must have αy
∗
cc > (1− α) z∗cc. Consider the possibility that
s∗M < s (we consider s
∗
M = s below). If this is to be the case, then (1− α) z∗M ≥
αy∗M so that αy
∗
cc > (1− α) z∗cc > (1− α) z∗M ≥ αy∗M . Hence, we must have
y∗M < y
∗
cc. It remains to show the case of s
∗
M = s. Substitute (12) into (11) and
(28) into (27) to obtain s∗cc = s = h
0
(z∗cc)−c
0
(y∗cc) = h
0
(z∗M )−c
0
(y∗M ) = s = s
∗
M .
Clearly, z∗M < z
∗
cc implies y
∗
M < y
∗
cc. This completes the proof of case b).
c) Observe that if s < s∗cc < s; then
z∗cc
α
=
y∗cc
1−α = x
∗
cc. Hence, from the
relationship p (x∗cc) = (1− α) c
0
(y∗cc) + αh
0
(z∗cc) we have
p (x∗cc) = (1− α) c
0
((1− α)x∗cc)+αh
0
(αx∗cc). Next, consider the possibility
that s < s∗M < s (the possibilities that s
∗
M = s and s
∗
M = s are considered
below).We then know that p (x∗M ) +
dp
dxx
∗
M = c
0
(y∗M ) = h
0
(z∗M ). This may
be rewritten: p (x∗M ) = (1− α) c
0
(y∗M ) + αh
0
(z∗M ) −
dp
dxx
∗
M . However, as s <
s∗M < s we know that
z∗M
α
=
y∗M
1−α = x
∗
M . Inserting these relationships in the
above expression we arrive at p (x∗M ) = (1− α) c
0
((1− α)x∗M ) + αh
0
(αx∗M ) −
dp
dxx
∗
M . Hence, p (x
∗
M )− p (x∗cc) = (1− α)
h
c
0
((1− α)x∗M )− c
0
((1− α)x∗cc)
i
+
α
h
h
0
(αx∗M )− h
0
(αx∗cc)
i
− dpdxx∗M . To obtain a contradiction assume: x∗M ≥ x∗cc.
Observe that the l.h.s. of the above expression is non-positive, while the r.h.s.
is strictly positive. Hence, we must have x∗M < x
∗
cc and y
∗
M = (1− α)x∗M <
(1− α)x∗cc = y∗cc and z∗M = αx∗M < αx∗cc = z∗cc, i.e. y∗M < y∗cc and z∗M < z∗cc.
Next, consider the case of s∗M = s. To obtain a contradiction, assume y
∗
M ≥
y∗cc. Substituting (4) into (3) and (28) into (27) we have: s
∗
cc = h
0
(z∗cc) −
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c
0
(y∗cc) < h
0
(z∗M )− c
0
(y∗M ) = s. Clearly, the assumption that y
∗
M ≥ y∗cc implies
z∗M ≥ z∗cc so that x∗M > x∗cc and p (x∗M ) < p (x∗cc). From here, we follow the part
of the proof under a) showing that we cannot have p (x∗M ) ≤ p (x∗cc). Hence, we
must have y∗M < y
∗
cc. We know that this also implies z
∗
M < z
∗
cc. To see this,
observe that s < s∗cc < s implies (1− α) z∗cc = αy∗cc and that s∗M = s implies
αy∗M > (1− α) z∗M . Hence, (1− α) z∗cc = αy∗cc > αy∗M > (1− α) z∗M , so that
z∗M < z
∗
cc.
To complete the proof we now consider s∗M = s. To obtain a contradiction,
assume z∗M ≥ z∗cc. Substituting (12) into (11) and (28) into (27) we get s∗cc =
h
0
(z∗cc)− c
0
(y∗cc) > h
0
(z∗M ) − c
0
(y∗M ) = s. Clearly, as by assumption z
∗
M ≥ z∗cc
we must also have y∗M ≥ y∗cc and x∗M ≥ x∗cc so that p (x∗M ) ≤ p (x∗cc). From here
we follow the part of the proof under a) showing that we cannot have p (x∗M ) ≤
p (x∗cc). Hence, we must have z
∗
M < z
∗
cc.
Finally, we show that z∗M < z
∗
cc implies y
∗
M < y
∗
cc for the case of s
∗
M = s.
Observe that s < s∗cc < s implies αy
∗
cc = (1− α) z∗cc and that s∗M = s implies
(1− α) z∗M > αy∗M . Hence, αy∗cc = (1− α) z∗cc > (1− α) z∗M > αy∗M , so that
y∗M < y
∗
cc.
As expected, the case of joint market power will reduce the generation of both
green and black electricity as compared with the competitive solution. The joint
market power will also increase the profit from both generation technologies. As
stated in proposition 7 above, the certificate price may go in both directions in
this case.
8 Compatibility of GCs and CO2 taxes
Assume the producers of black electricity are subject to a CO2 tax, t, per
unit kWh generated. Under perfect competition this gives rise to the following
modification of the first order condition for the producers of black electricity:
q = c
0
(y) + t. (4’, 8’, 12’)
Otherwise, the conditions remain the same. The next proposition shows
that - contrary to what one should expect - an increase of the CO2 tax leads
to a reduction of the generation of green electricity, provided that the ”percent-
age requirement” is binding and that there is an intermediate certificate price.
Hence, the CO2 tax does not stimulate the generation of CO2-free electricity in
this setting. However, if the certificate price is at the price bounds it will stim-
ulate the generation of green electricity. To see this use condition (40) instead
of (4), (80) instead of (8) and (120) instead of (12).
Proposition 11 Under the assumptions of the model i)
dz∗cc
dt < 0 and
dy∗cc
dt < 0,
provided that s < s∗cc < s and ii)
dz∗cc
dt > 0 and
dy∗cc
dt < 0, provided that s
∗
cc = s
or s∗cc = s.
Proof. See appendix I.
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The intuition for the somewhat surprising first result (i)) is that a CO2 tax
leads to an increase in the wholesale price of electricity. However, for each dollar
of increased wholesale price the producers of green electricity suﬀer a loss of 1/α
dollars. Hence, the producers of green electricity stands to loose as the sum of
the wholesale price and the certificate price, q + s, is reduced. This then leads
to a reduction of the generation of green electricity.
The next proposition shows that a CO2 tax may stimulate green electricity
generation for the cases where market power prevails. This will definitely be so
if the demand is linear.
Proposition 12 Under the assumptions of the model i)
dz∗mc
dt > 0 and
dy∗mc
dt < 0;
ii)
dz∗cm
dt > 0 and
dy∗cm
dt < 0; iii)
dz∗mm
dt > 0 and
dy∗mm
dt < 0; iv)
dz∗M
dt > 0 and
dy∗M
dt < 0, provided that
∂2p
∂x2 ≤ 0.
Proof. See appendix J.
Hence, there is nothing surprising in these results. One should remember
that the certificate system faced with market power basically has collapsed into
a system of per unit subsidies with well known eﬀects.
9 Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper we have focused on the eﬀect of market power in a system of Green
Certificates (GCs). We have developed an analytic model for the electricity and
the GC markets and derived results under diﬀerent assumptions of competition.
In particular, we have focused on the generation of green electricity. The main
results are:
• Under perfect competition, the eﬀect of changing the percentage require-
ment, α, for the obligatory share of GCs a consumer must hold is most
inconclusive. If the GC-price is at the lower or upper price bound, an
increase of the percentage requirement will actually lead to a decrease in
the generation of green electricity. On the other hand, at intermediate
GC-prices the eﬀect on generation of green electricity is indeterminate.
Hence, increasing the obligatory share of GCs may in fact lead to lower
end-use prices and larger consumption under specific formulations of the
demand and cost functions. However, in the cases of a GC-price at one of
the price bounds, the eﬀect of increasing α will always be reduced genera-
tion of green electricity and also reduced total generation. Thus, in these
cases one of the costs associated by increasing the generation of green
electricity within a GC system is a reduction of consumer and producer
surplus.
• The existence of market power in either the generation of black electricity
or in the generation of green electricity, and in the case of market power
in both generation technologies, will all induce a GC-price at either the
upper or the lower price bound. A market based GC-price within the price
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bound will never exist in these three cases. In the case of market power in
the joint production of black and green electricity we may, however, get
an intermediate GC-price.
• Market power exercised by the producers of black electricity may actu-
ally lead to an increase of the generation of green electricity as compared
with the competitive equilibrium. This is definitely true if the competi-
tive equilibrium GC-price is at its lower bound. The generation of black
electricity will, however, always decrease in this case.
• Market power exercised by the producers of green electricity will provide
these producers with the possibility to hold back some of the GCs they
generate. However, we show that this will never be profitable for them,
i.e. the producers of green electricity will never sell less certificates than
they generate. This result is also valid in the case of market power in the
joint production of black and green electricity.
• Market power among the producers of green electricity necessarily leads
to a reduction of green electricity generation. However, the generation of
black electricity may increase as compared with the competitive equilib-
rium. This is definitely true if the competitive equilibrium GC-price is at
its upper bound.
• Market power in both generation technologies, resulted in an indetermi-
nate eﬀect on the generation of both black and green electricity, as com-
pared with the competitive case.
• Market power in the joint generation of black and green electricity by a
monopolistic company, is shown to induce a reduction in the generation
of both black and green electricity from the competitive equilibrium.
• The introduction of a CO2-tax on the producers of black electricity in a
GC system may actually induce a reduction in the generation of green
electricity. This happens in the competitive case, given an intermediate
GC-price. Finally, it has been shown that a CO2 tax may stimulate green
electricity generation for the cases where market power prevails. This will
definitely be so if the demand is linear.
Based on the above summary it seems fair to conclude that the introduction
of a GC system as a means for promoting green electricity generation includes
a number of potential pitfalls. As our analysis has shown, a GC system may
in many cases induce unexpected eﬀects on the generation of green electricity.
In particular the GC system’s sensitivity to market power should be noticed.
As market power in most cases will prevent the realization of a market based
GC-price within the specified price interval, the GC system will most likely be
reduced to a system of direct subsidies financed through consumer/producer
taxes. Considering the large probability that some form of market power will
exist and the possible high administration costs associated by a GC system,
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this result should be given serious attention. It can hardly be cost eﬃcient to
introduce a GC system that in the end will function just like an ordinary subsidy
scheme.
The main objective of a GC system is to promote the generation of green
electricity. To the extent that the generation of green electricity substitutes
black electricity, an additional eﬀect of the GC system may be to reduce CO2
emission. However, compared with a system of CO2-taxes or quotas, a GC
system is less diﬀerentiated with respect to the emission of green house gases.
At least under the versions of the system considered in various countries at
the moment, a generation technology is either green or black. A generation
technology with low emission of CO2 (e.g. a natural gas power plant) will, in
a GC system, be treated on equal terms as a technology with relatively higher
emissions (e.g. a coal power plant). In addition, the GC system considers
all green electricity as equal. It pays no attention to the fact that also green
generation technologies may have negative external eﬀects, e.g. the noise and
negative eﬀects in the landscape caused by wind mill farms.
The GC system will typically induce higher prices and lower consumption
of electricity. The decision about the percentage requirement, α, will be of
importance for the welfare eﬀects of the GC system. In addition, as shown
for the competitive equilibrium, it is not generally true that an increase of α
leads to larger generation of green electricity in equilibrium. When deciding
the size of α one should therefore weigh the negative eﬀects on consumer and
producer surplus against the assumed positive eﬀects on the generation of green
electricity.
On the basis of the results obtained in this article we recommend a great
amount of consideration to be done before implementing a GC system.
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Appendix
A A numerical model
In this appendix we will present a simple numerical model satisfying the as-
sumptions we have made about the electricity market. The model will be used
to provide proofs for the existence of some of the results referred to in the
propositions in this article. We assume the following functions:
The inverse demand function is given by:
p (x) = a− bx,with a, b > 0.
This gives:
p
0
(x) = −b < 0.
The technology for generation of black electricity is summarized in the cost
function:
c (y) =
1
2
y2, with c
0
(y) = y > 0 and c
00
(y) = 1 ≥ 0.
The producers of green electricity have the following cost function:
h (z) =
c
2
z2 + gz, where c, g > 0, with h
0
(z) = cz + g > 0 and h
00
(z) = c ≥ 0.
Running the model produces three sets of possible equilibrium solutions,
one for each of the cases where the GC-price is at either the upper or the lower
bound, and one for the case of an ”interior” solution where the GC-price is
decided in the market. However, for an equilibrium solution to be valid, all
the first order conditions must be satisfied. Focus therefore on the first order
conditions specified in equation (14). This expression state that in the case of an
interior solution for the GC-price, total consumption, x∗, in equilibrium, shall
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be equal to z
∗
α
, while for GC-prices at either the lower or at the upper bound,
total consumption shall be higher or lower than z
∗
α
, respectively. A violation
of this condition will mean that the composition of green and black electricity
is incompatible with the amount of GCs sold in the market, i.e. it is not an
equilibrium solution. The GC system states that we shall always have z ≥ αx.
The only case where this condition can be violated is when there is an excess
demand for GCs. In that case, the consumers can increase the share of black
electricity in their consumption above α by paying a fine corresponding to the
upper price bound. Thus in such a situation we must have x > z
∗
α
, or z
∗
x∗ < α.
Otherwise, the share of green electricity, as part of total electricity consumption,
must be at least equal to the specified α. This means that in the case where we
are at the lower price bound for the GC-price we must have that z
∗
x∗ > α. If this
is not the case, the consumption of green electricity as part of total electricity
consumption is too low and the rules of the GC system are violated. The NC-
playing producers must then chose one of the two other equilibrium solutions.
Therefore, for a solution of the numerical model to be valid, the consistency
condition must be fulfilled in equilibrium. We will therefore in our examples
below include a consistency check variable for each equilibrium solution.
B Proposition 2
First, according to proposition 2 i) we will show an example of a case where the
numerical model generates an interior GC-price in the mc-case. This is used as
background for Figure 2, which shows that this cannot be a NC-equilibrium.
Then we will show that if the producers of black electricity act as a NC-playing
oligopolist (or a perfectly co-ordinated cartel) facing green producers as a com-
petitive fringe, the price of GCs can be either at the lower bound, s, or at the
upper bound, s.
The following parameter values are used to generate an interior GC-price:
α = 0.6, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 50 and s = 10. The result is
presented in the table below.
s∗mc z
∗
mc y
∗
mc x
∗
mc p
∗
mc q
∗
mc s
∗
mc Π (z
∗
mc) Π (y
∗
mc)
z∗mc
x∗mc
Interior 31.2 20.8 52.0 48.0 20.8 45.4 936.9 215.9 0.6
Min. 25.4 22.9 48.3 51.8 45.8 10 643.9 784.9 0.526
Max. 34.4 11.9 46.3 53.8 23.8 50 1181.6 211.5 0.743
The value in the last column is used as a consistency check. In this case,
none of the solutions with a GC-price at one of the price bounds fulfill the
consistency condition. Hence, the only possible solution is for s∗mc = 45.4,
which is within the price interval. However, as proved formally in Proposition
2 i), and illustrated in Figure 2, this is not a NC-equilibrium as the producers
of black electricity can increase their profit by reducing their generation by ²,
implying the corner solution s∗mc = s.
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Proving Proposition 2 ii),we are assuming the following values for the ex-
ogenous variables:
α = 0.5, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 28 and s = 10.
s∗mc z
∗
mc y
∗
mc x
∗
mc p
∗
mc q
∗
mc s
∗
mc Π (z
∗
mc) Π (y
∗
mc)
z∗mc
x∗mc
Interior 28.1 28.1 56.3 43.7 28.1 31.1 735.7 396.0 0.5
Min. 25.6 23.1 48.8 51.3 46.3 10 656.6 802.1 0.526
Max. 30.1 18.6 48.8 51.3 37.3 28 907.5 520.3 0.618
The NC playing generator of black electricity will choose the quantity that
maximizes its profit. Actually we can already exclude the interior solution as we
have shown that this will never be optimal for a generator with market power.
We can see from the table above that y∗ = 23.1 is the profit maximizing quantity
of black electricity. This corresponds to a GC-price at the lower price bound.
However, to be sure that this is an attainable equilibrium we must check the
consistency condition. From the above discussion we know that in the case of
s∗ = s we must have z
∗
x∗ = 0.526 > α. In the example we have α = 0.5 so this
is a valid solution with s∗mc = s.
Using the same parameter values as above, but with α = 0.65 and s = 15
provides the following result.
s∗mc z
∗
mc y
∗
mc x
∗
mc p
∗
mc q
∗
mc s
∗
mc Π (z
∗
mc) Π (y
∗
mc)
z∗mc
x∗mc
Interior 32.1 17.3 49.4 50.6 17.3 51.1 1006.4 149.8 0.65
Min. 25.3 22.8 48.0 52.0 45.5 10 637.6 776.3 0.526
Max. 26.3 21.3 47.6 52.4 42.6 15 692.3 681.3 0.552
Again, the monopolist will want the situation where the GC-price is at the
lower price bound. However, this gives z
∗
x∗ = 0.526 < α. The solution is therefore
not consistent with the ”percentage requirement”. The second best solution for
the monopolist is to choose y∗ = 17.6, which corresponds to a GC-price at the
upper bound, i.e. we have s∗mc = s.
We have thus proved the existence of s∗mc = s and s
∗
mc = s.
C Proposition 3
We want to show the existence of z∗mc < z
∗
cc and z
∗
mc > z
∗
cc, given that the
competitive GC-price is above the lower price bound, i.e. s∗cc > s.
We assume the following parameter values:
α = 0.46, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 28 and s = 10.
The result is showed in the tables below.
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s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 26.2 30.8 57.0 43.0 30.8 26.7 686.9 473.3 0.46
Min. 21.1 37.2 58.2 41.8 37.2 10 444.4 690.4 0.362
Max. 26.6 30.2 56.9 43.1 30.2 28.0 708.8 457.5 0.468
s∗mc z
∗
mc y
∗
mc x
∗
mc p
∗
mc q
∗
mc s
∗
mc Π (z
∗
mc) Π (y
∗
mc)
z∗mc
x∗mc
Interior 26.5 31.1 57.7 42.3 31.1 24.4 635.8 484.7 0.46
Min. 25.7 23.2 49.0 51.1 46.5 10 661.8 809.1 0.526
Max. 30.4 18.9 49.3 50.7 37.8 28 924.5 536.1 0.617
Under perfect competition in both technologies, all the producers are price
takers. We see from the first table that the competitive equilibrium is at the
interior solution with s∗cc = 26.7 . The consistency is OK as
z∗cc
x∗cc
= 0.46 = α.
Thus we have z∗cc = 26.2. From the second table we observe that the equilibrium
quantity of green electricity is z∗mc = 25.7. The consistency check proves to be
OK and we have z∗mc < z
∗
cc.
Changing the lower price bound on GCs to s = 15 and solving the model
again we get the following result:
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 26.2 30.8 57.0 43.0 30.8 26.7 686.9 473.3 0.46
Min. 22.6 35.2 57.9 42.1 35.2 15 511.7 620.9 0.391
Max. 26.6 30.2 56.9 43.1 30.2 28.0 708.8 457.5 0.468
s∗mc z
∗
mc y
∗
mc x
∗
mc p
∗
mc q
∗
mc s
∗
mc Π (z
∗
mc) Π (y
∗
mc)
z∗mc
x∗mc
Interior 26.5 31.1 57.7 42.3 31.1 24.4 635.8 484.7 0.46
Min. 27.0 22.0 49.1 51.0 44.1 15 730.4 727.7 0.551
Max. 30.4 18.9 49.3 50.7 37.8 28 924.5 536.1 0.617
The competitive equilibrium generates then z∗cc = 26.2, while oligopolistic
producers of black electricity choose y∗mc = 22.0, which implies z
∗
mc = 27.0 > z
∗
cc.
Thus, we have shown the existence of both z∗mc < z
∗
cc and z
∗
mc > z
∗
cc.
D Proposition 4
According to proposition 4 ii) we will show that if the producers of green elec-
tricity act as a NC-playing oligopolist (or a perfectly co-ordinated cartel) facing
green producers as a competitive fringe, the price of GCs can be either at the
lower bound, s, or at the upper bound, s.
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First, we solve the model assuming the same parameter values as in the first
part of the example for proposition 2 above. Thereafter we solve the model
assuming α = 0.2 and s = 10. The results are presented in the following two
tables. As we have proved that a solution with a certificate price within the
price interval never will be chosen in the cm-case, we are omitting the interior
solution from the results.
s∗cm z
∗
cm y
∗
cm x
∗
cm p
∗
cm q
∗
cm s
∗
cm Π (z
∗
cm) Π (y
∗
cm)
z∗cm
x∗cm
Min. 15.0 40.0 55.0 45.0 40.0 10 450.0 800.0 0.273
Max. 18.9 33.6 52.4 47.6 33.6 28 711.2 563.5 0.360
s∗cm z
∗
cm y
∗
cm x
∗
cm p
∗
cm q
∗
cm s
∗
cm Π (z
∗
cm) Π (y
∗
cm)
z∗cm
x∗cm
Min. 18.0 39.0 57.0 43.0 39.0 20 648.0 760.5 0.316
Max. 20.1 37.2 57.2 42.8 37.2 28 804.6 690.9 0.350
As we can see from the first table, the generator of green electricity will
choose the equilibrium solution with s∗cm = s, which generates the highest profit.
In the second table, the generator also wants to be where the GC-price is at the
upper bound. However, the consistency condition in not fulfilled as
z∗mc
x∗mc
> α,
so this is not an attainable equilibrium. Therefore, the generator chooses the
solution which generates a certificate price at the lower bound, i.e. s∗cm = s.
E Proposition 6
We want to show the existence of y∗cm < y
∗
cc and y
∗
cm > y
∗
cc, given that the
competitive GC-price is below the upper price bound, i.e. s∗cc < s.
We assume the following parameter values:
α = 0.4, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 25 and s = 15.
The result is showed in the tables below. As for proposition 4 we are omitting
the interior solution for the market power case as this is proved to never be
realized.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 23.3 35.0 58.3 41.7 35.0 16.7 544.4 612.5 0.4
Min. 22.8 35.6 58.4 41.6 35.6 15 519.8 633.7 0.390
Max. 26.0 32.0 58.0 42.0 32.0 25 676.0 512.0 0.448
s∗cm z
∗
cm y
∗
cm x
∗
cm p
∗
cm q
∗
cm s
∗
cm Π (z
∗
cm) Π (y
∗
cm)
z∗cm
x∗cm
Min. 16.3 38.9 55.1 44.9 38.9 15 530.4 754.9 0.295
Max. 18.6 35.7 54.3 45.7 35.7 25 689.8 637.8 0.342
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The competitive equilibrium generates s∗cc = 16.7 < s = 25, which implies
y∗cc = 35.0. Market power among the producers of green electricity makes them
choose s∗cm = s, which generates y
∗
cm = 35.7 > y
∗
cc.
Increasing the upper bound certificate price to s = 28, but otherwise keeping
the same parameter values as above, we arrive at the following result:
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 23.3 35.0 58.3 41.7 35.0 16.7 544.4 612.5 0.4
Min. 22.8 35.6 58.4 41.6 35.6 15 519.8 633.7 0.390
Max. 27.0 30.9 57.9 42.1 30.9 28 726.8 478.0 0.466
s∗cm z
∗
cm y
∗
cm x
∗
cm p
∗
cm q
∗
cm s
∗
cm Π (z
∗
cm) Π (y
∗
cm)
z∗cm
x∗cm
Min. 16.3 38.9 55.1 44.9 38.9 15 530.4 754.9 0.295
Max. 19.3 34.8 54.0 46.0 34.8 28 741.7 604.5 0.356
We get s∗cc = 16.7 < s = 28 and y
∗
cc = 35.0. Further we have s
∗
cm = s, which
generates y∗cm = 34.8 < y
∗
cc.
F Proposition 7
We will show the existence of s∗mm = s and s
∗
mm = s. We assume the following
parameter values:
α = 0.35, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 13 and s = 10.
The results are presented in the tables below. Again we are omitting the
interior solution for the market power case as this is proved to never be realized
in the mm-case.
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 18.9 25.9 44.8 55.2 51.7 10 715.1 1003.4 0.422
Max. 19.5 25.3 44.8 55.2 50.6 13 763.3 960.5 0.436
The consistency check shows that only s∗mm = s can be a valid solution in
this case.
Increasing α to 0.6, but otherwise keeping the same parameter values, we
get the following result.
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 18.5 25.2 43.6 56.4 50.4 10 681.1 951.2 0.423
Max. 18.9 24.4 43.4 56.6 48.8 13 717.9 894.4 0.437
Again we have only one consistent equilibrium solution, i.e. s∗mm = s.
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G Proposition 8
We will show that under the assumptions of the model we have that sign (y∗mm − y∗cc)
and sign (z∗mm − y∗cc) are both indeterminate, irrespective of whether s < s∗cc <
s, s∗cc = s or s
∗
cc = s.
a) y∗mm < y
∗
cc and z
∗
mm < z
∗
cc, given s
∗
cc = s :
Parameter values: α = 0.35, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 25 and
s = 15.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 20.6 38.3 58.9 41.1 38.3 7.9 425.3 733.4 0.35
Min. 23.0 35.9 58.9 41.2 35.9 15 526.7 644.4 0.390
Max. 26.3 32.5 58.8 41.3 32.5 25 689.1 528.1 0.447
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 20.0 24.9 44.9 55.1 49.9 15 796.4 932.4 0.445
Max. 22.0 23.1 45.1 54.9 46.1 25 972.0 798.2 0.489
The cc-case produces a solution with s∗cc = 7.9 < s = 15, i.e. we get s
∗
cc = s.
The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case, only the equilibrium with
s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get y
∗
mm = 20.0 < y
∗
cc = 23.0
and z∗mm = 24.9 < z
∗
cc = 35.9.
b) y∗mm > y
∗
cc, given s
∗
cc = s :
Parameter values: α = 0.73, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 80 and
s = 70.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 32.9 12.2 45.1 54.9 12.2 58.6 1081.6 74.0 0.73
Min. 35.8 6.6 42.3 57.7 6.6 70 1280.2 21.5 0.845
Max. 38.3 1.6 40.0 60.0 1.6 80 1468.4 1.3 0.959
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 26.6 7.4 34.0 66.0 14.9 70 1417.1 82.7 0.782
Max. 28.0 4.5 32.5 67.5 9.1 80 1570.0 30.7 0.861
The cc-case produces a solution with s∗cc = 58.6 < s = 70, i.e. we get
s∗cc = s. The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case, only the equilibrium
with s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get y
∗
mm = 7.4 > y
∗
cc = 6.6.
c) z∗mm > z
∗
cc, given s
∗
cc = s :
Parameter values: α = 0.2, a = 100, b = 1, c = 1.4, g = 47, s = 65 and
s = 22.
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s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 10.7 42.7 53.4 46.6 42.7 19.2 79.9 913.2 0.2
Min. 12.0 41.8 53.8 46.2 41.8 22 100.8 873.6 0.223
Max. 32.4 27.3 59.7 40.3 27.3 65 733.4 373.1 0.542
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 12.6 27.7 40.3 59.7 55.3 22 271.2 1147.3 0.314
Max. 24.8 20.7 45.5 54.5 41.5 65 1044.1 654.2 0.544
The cc-case produces a solution with s∗cc = 19.2 < s = 22, i.e. we get s
∗
cc = s.
The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case, only the equilibrium with
s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get z
∗
mm = 12.6 > z
∗
cc = 12.0.
d) y∗mm < y
∗
cc and z
∗
mm < z
∗
cc, given s
∗
cc = s :
Parameter values: α = 0.5, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 25 and s = 15.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 27.9 27.9 55.7 44.3 27.9 32.9 776.0 388.0 0.5
Min. 22.5 35.0 57.5 42.5 35.0 15 506.3 612.5 0.391
Max. 25.5 31.0 56.5 43.5 31.0 25 650.3 480.5 0.451
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 19.5 24.3 43.9 56.1 48.6 15 764.0 887.1 0.446
Max. 21.4 22.0 43.4 56.6 44.1 25 912.8 729.0 0.492
The cc-case produces a solution with s∗cc = 32.9 > s = 25, i.e. we get s
∗
cc = s.
The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case, only the equilibrium with
s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get y
∗
mm = 22.0 < y
∗
cc = 25.5
and z∗mm = 21.4 < z
∗
cc = 25.5.
e) y∗mm > y
∗
cc, given s
∗
cc = s :
Parameter values: α = 0.8, a = 100, b = 1, c = 1.5, g = 35, s = 70 and
s = 15.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 28.8 7.2 36.0 64.0 7.2 71.0 622.1 25.9 0.8
Min. 12.0 38.0 50.0 50.0 38.0 15 108.0 722.0 0.240
Max. 28.5 7.8 36.3 63.8 7.8 70 609.2 30.0 0.786
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 12.2 25.3 37.5 62.5 50.5 15 260.9 957.3 0.326
Max. 20.3 7.9 28.2 71.8 15.8 70 722.3 93.5 0.720
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The cc-case produces a solution with s∗cc = 71.0 > s = 70, i.e. we get
s∗cc = s. The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case, only the equilibrium
with s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get y
∗
mm = 7.9 < y
∗
cc = 7.8
.
f) z∗mm > z
∗
cc, given s
∗
cc = s:
Parameter values: α = 0.7, a = 100, b = 1, c = 5, g = 10, s = 30 and
s = 15.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 18.4 7.9 26.3 73.7 7.9 94.1 845.5 31.1 0.7
Min. 9.0 40.2 49.3 50.7 40.2 15 204.6 809.1 0.184
Max. 10.8 34.1 44.9 55.1 34.1 30 292.6 581.1 0.241
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 9.7 26.6 36.3 63.7 53.2 15 329.3 1061.3 0.267
Max. 10.9 22.7 33.6 66.4 45.4 30 415.8 772.9 0.324
The cc-case produces a solution with s∗cc = 94.1 > s = 30, i.e. we get s
∗
cc = s.
The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case, only the equilibrium with
s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get z
∗
mm = 10.9 > y
∗
cc = 10.8 .
g) y∗mm < y
∗
cc and z
∗
mm < z
∗
cc, given s < s
∗
cc < s :
Parameter values: α = 0.35, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 25 and s = 5.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 20.6 38.3 58.9 41.1 38.3 7.9 425.3 733.4 0.35
Min. 19.7 39.3 59.0 41.1 39.3 5 386.1 772.2 0.333
Max. 26.3 32.5 58.8 41.3 32.5 25 689.1 528.1 0.447
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 17.9 26.8 44.7 55.3 53.6 5 638.2 1077.0 0.400
Max. 22.0 23.1 45.1 54.9 46.1 25 972.0 798.2 0.489
The cc-case produces a solution with s = 5 < s∗cc = 7.9 < s = 25, i.e. we get
an interior solution for s∗cc. The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case,
only the equilibrium with s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get
y∗mm = 26.8 < y
∗
cc = 38.3 and z
∗
mm = 17.9 < z
∗
cc = 20.6.
h) y∗mm > y
∗
cc, given s < s
∗
cc < s :
Parameter values: α = 0.8, a = 100, b = 50, c = 2.5, g = 5, s = 10 and
s = 4.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 1.5 0.4 1.9 7.0 0.4 8.3 2.8 0.1 0.8
Min. 0.3 1.6 1.9 4.8 1.6 4 0.1 1.4 0.136
Max. 2.0 −0.1 1.8 7.9 −0.1 10 4.8 0.0 1.061
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s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 0.6 0.7 1.3 36.5 33.3 4 19.4 21.6 0.485
Max. 0.7 0.6 1.2 37.7 29.7 10 22.4 17.2 0.532
The cc-case produces a solution with s = 4 < s∗cc = 8.3 < s = 10, i.e. we get
an interior solution for s∗cc. The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case,
only the equilibrium with s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get
y∗mm = 0.6 > y
∗
cc = 0.4.
i) z∗mm > z
∗
cc, given s < s
∗
cc < s:
Parameter values: α = 0.2, a = 100, b = 50, c = 2.5, g = 5, s = 10 and
s = 4.
s∗cc z
∗
cc y
∗
cc x
∗
cc p
∗
cc q
∗
cc s
∗
cc Π (z
∗
cc) Π (y
∗
cc)
z∗cc
x∗cc
Interior 0.4 1.6 2.0 2.4 1.6 4.4 0.2 1.2 0.2
Min. 0.3 1.7 2.0 2.5 1.7 4 0.1 1.4 0.139
Max. 2.0 0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 10 4.9 0.0 1.014
s∗mm z
∗
mm y
∗
mm x
∗
mm p
∗
mm q
∗
mm s
∗
mm Π (z
∗
mm) Π (y
∗
mm)
z∗mm
x∗mm
Min. 0.6 0.7 1.3 34.9 34.1 4 20.4 22.6 0.485
Max. 0.7 0.6 1.3 33.8 31.8 10 25.2 19.6 0.529
The cc-case produces a solution with s = 4 < s∗cc = 4.4 < s = 10, i.e. we get
an interior solution for s∗cc. The consistency condition is OK. In the mm-case,
only the equilibrium with s∗cc = s fulfills the consistency condition, i.e. we get
z∗mm = 0.6 > z
∗
cc = 0.4.
H Proposition 9
We will show the existence of an interior certificate price, i.e. s < s∗M < s. We
assume the following parameter values:
α = 0.65, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 80 and s = 50.
The model generates the following result:
s∗M z
∗
M y
∗
M x
∗
M p
∗
M q
∗
M s
∗
M Π (z
∗
M ) Π (y
∗
M )
z∗M
x∗M
Interior 14.0 7.5 21.5 78.5 29.0 76.2 1203.7 189.6 0.650
Min. 25.3 5.6 30.9 69.1 11.3 50 783.1 47.5 0.818
Max. 34.1 −6.8 27.4 72.6 −13.5 80 934.2 68.3 1.247
The generator now wants to maximize its total profit from the generation of
both black and green electricity. Maximum total profit is where s∗mm = 76.2.
Thus, we have s = 50 < s∗M = 76.2 < s = 80.
37
We will now show that we can have s∗M at either of the price bounds, i.e.
s∗M = s or s
∗
M = s. We assume the following parameter values:
α = 0.4, a = 100, b = 1, c = 2, g = 5, s = 25 and s = 10.
We get the following result:
s∗mm z
∗
M y
∗
M x
∗
M p
∗
M q
∗
M s
∗
M Π (z
∗
M ) Π (y
∗
M )
z∗M
x∗M
Interior 7.6 11.4 18.9 81.1 30.3 127.0 1095.3 279.2 0.400
Min. 17.1 19.3 36.4 63.6 38.5 20 622.9 555.8 0.471
Max. 18.8 17.5 36.3 63.8 35.0 25 679.7 459.4 0.517
Maximum total profit is where s∗M = 127.0, however this is far above the
upper price bound, s. The best attainable equilibrium solution in this case is
therefore s∗M = s.
Keeping the same parameter values, except for changing the ”percentage
requirement” to α = 0.6, the model produces this result:
s∗M z
∗
M y
∗
M x
∗
M p
∗
M q
∗
M s
∗
M Π (z
∗
M ) Π (y
∗
M )
z∗M
x∗M
Interior 12.8 8.5 21.3 78.7 29.9 81.3 1195.5 218.5 0.600
Min. 16.6 18.3 34.9 65.1 36.5 20 579.8 499.6 0.477
Max. 18.1 16.3 34.4 65.6 32.5 25 623.0 396.1 0.527
Here, maximum total profit is at s∗M = 81.3. However, again this is far above
the upper price bound, s. The second best solution is where s∗M = s, but this
is incompatible with the consistency condition. The only possible equilibrium
is therefore where s∗M = s.
I Proposition 11
In order to simplify the presentation we are omitting the subscripts cc referring
to the case of perfect competition as we go through the proof for proposition
11.
Proof. i) The case of s < s∗cc < s
The equilibrium is characterized by:
p (x) = q + αs
q = c
0
(y) + t
q + s = h
0
(z)
x = y + z
x = z
α
z = αx, y = x− z = z
α
− z =
¡
1−α
α
¢
z, y = (1− α)x
Substitution gives:
p (x) = c
0
(y) + t+ α
³
h
0
(z)−
³
c
0
(y) + t
´´
p (x) = (1− α)
³
c
0
(y) + t
´
+ αh
0
(z)
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Calculating dzdt :
p
¡
z
α
¢
= (1− α)
³
c
0 ¡1−α
α
z
¢
+ t
´
+ αh
0
(z)
∂p
∂x
1
α
dz
dt = (1− α) c
00
(y) 1−α
α
dz
dt + (1− α) + αh
00
(z) dzdth
∂p
∂x
1
α
− (1−α)
2
α
c
00
(y)− αh00 (z)
i
dz
dt = (1− α)
dz
dt =
(1−α)α
[ ∂p∂x−(1−α)
2c00 (y)−α2h00 (z)]
< 0
Calculating dydt :
p
³
1
1−α
´
= (1− α)
³
c
0
(y) + t
´
+ αh
0
³
α
1−αy
´
∂p
∂x
1
1−α
dy
dt = (1− α) c
00 dy
dt + (1− α) + αh
00 α
1−α
dy
dth
∂p
∂x
³
1
1−α
´
− (1− α) c00 − α21−αh
00
i
= 1− αh
∂p
∂x − (1− α)
2
c
00 − α2h00
i
dy
dt = (1− α)
2
dy
dt =
(1−α)2
[ ∂p∂x−(1−α)
2c00−α2h00 ]
< 0
ii) The case of s∗cc = s or s
∗
cc = s
The equilibrium is characterized by:
p (x) = q + αs
q = c
0
(y) + t
q + s = h
0
(z)
x = y + z
Substitution gives:
p (y + z) = c
0
(y) + t+ αs
c
0
(y) + t+ s = h
0
(z)
p (y + z)− c0 (y) = t+ αs
c
0
(y)− h0 (z) = − (t+ s)
Calculating dydt and
dz
dt :
∂p
∂y
dy
dt +
∂p
∂x
dz
dt − c
00
(y) dydt = 1
c
00
(y) dydt − h
00
(z) dzdt = −1·
∂p
∂x − c
00 ∂p
∂x
c
00 −h00
¸ ·
dy
dt
dz
dt
¸
=
·
1
−1
¸
Let A =
·
∂p
∂x − c
00 ∂p
∂x
c
00 −h00
¸
detA =
³
∂p
∂x − c
00
´³
−h00
´
− c00 ∂p
∂x > 0
dy
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1 ∂p∂x−1 −h00
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
detA
−h
00
−(−1 ∂p∂x)
detA =
−h
00
+ ∂p
∂x
detA < 0
dz
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ∂p∂x − c
00
1
c
00 −1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
detA =
³
∂p
∂x−c
00´
(−1)−c
00
detA =
− ∂p
∂x
detA > 0
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J Proposition 12
As in the proof above, we are again omitting the subscripts referring to market
structure.
Proof. i) The case of s∗mc = s or s
∗
mc = s
The equilibrium is characterized by:
p (x) = q + αs
q + ∂q
∂yy = c
0
(y) + t
q + s = h
0
(z)
x = y + z
We have
∂q
∂y =
∂(p−αs)
∂y =
∂p
∂y =
∂p
∂x
∂x
∂y =
∂p
∂x
Substitution gives:
p (y + z) = h
0
(z)− s+ αs
h
0
(z)− s+ ∂p
∂xy = c
0
(y) + t
p (y + z)− h0 (z) = − (1− α) s
h
0
(z) + ∂p
∂xy − c
0
(y) = s+ t
Calculating dydt and
dz
dt :
∂p
∂x
dy
dt +
∂p
∂x
dz
dt − h
00
(z) dzdt = 0
h
00
(z) dzdt +
∂2p
∂x2 y
dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2 y
dz
dt +
∂p
∂x
dy
dt − c
00 dy
dt = 1"
∂p
∂x
∂p
∂x − h
00
∂2p
∂x2 y +
∂p
∂x − c
00
h
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 y
#·
dy
dt
dz
dt
¸
=
·
0
1
¸
Let B =
"
∂p
∂x
∂p
∂x − h
00
∂2p
∂x2 y +
∂p
∂x − c
00
h
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 y
#
detB = ∂p
∂x
³
h
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 y
´
−
³
∂2p
∂x2 y +
∂p
∂x − c
00
´³
∂p
∂x − h
00
´
detB = ∂p
∂xh
00
+ ∂p
∂x
∂2p
∂x2 y−
·
∂p
∂x
∂2p
∂x2 y −
∂2p
∂x2 yh
00
+
³
∂p
∂x
´2
− ∂p
∂xh
00 − c00 ∂p
∂x + c
00
h
00
¸
detB = ∂p
∂xh
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 yh
00 −
³
∂p
∂x
´2
+ ∂p
∂xh
00
+ c
00 ∂p
∂x − c
00
h
00
detB < 0 given ∂
2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
dy
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 0 ∂p∂x − h
00
1 h
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 y
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
detB =
−
³
∂p
∂x−h
00´
detB < 0 for
∂2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
dz
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ∂p∂x 0∂2p
∂x2 y +
∂p
∂x − c
00
1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
detB =
∂p
∂x
detB > 0 for
∂2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
ii) The case of s∗cm = s or s
∗
cm = s
The equilibrium is characterized by:
p (x) = q + αs
q = c
0
(y) + t
q + ∂q
∂z z + s = h
0
(z)
x = y + z
We have
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∂q
∂z =
∂(p−αs)
∂z =
∂p
∂z =
∂p
∂x
∂x
∂z =
∂p
∂x
Substitution gives:
p (y + z) = c
0
(y) + t+ αs
c
0
(y) + t+ ∂p
∂xz + s = h
0
(z)
p (y + z)− c0 (y) = t+ αs
c
0
(y) + ∂p
∂xz − h
0
(z) = − (t+ s)
Calculating dydt and
dz
dt :
∂p
∂x
dy
dt +
∂p
∂x
dz
dt − c
00 dy
dt = 1
c
00 dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2 z
dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2 z
dz
dt − h
00 dz
dt = −1"
∂p
∂x − c
00 ∂p
∂x
c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2
∂2p
∂x2 − h
00
#·
dy
dt
dz
dt
¸
=
·
1
−1
¸
Let E =
"
∂p
∂x − c
00 ∂p
∂x
c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2
∂2p
∂x2 − h
00
#
detE =
³
∂p
∂x − c
00
´³
∂2p
∂x2 z − h
00
´
−
³
c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 z
´
∂p
∂x
detE = ∂p
∂x
∂2p
∂x2 z −
∂p
∂xh
00 − c00 ∂
2p
∂x2 z + c
00
h
00 − ∂p
∂xc
00 − ∂p
∂x
∂2p
∂x2 z
detE = − ∂p
∂xh
00 − c00 ∂
2p
∂x2 z + c
00
h
00 − ∂p
∂xc
00
detE > 0 given ∂
2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
dy
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1 ∂p∂x−1 ∂2p
∂x2 z − h
00
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
detE =
∂2p
∂x2
z−h
00
−(− ∂p∂x)
detE < 0 given
∂2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
dz
dt =


¯¯¯¯
¯¯ ∂p∂x − c
00
1
c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 z −1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯


detE =
−
³
∂p
∂x−c
00´
−
³
c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2
z
´
detE =
− ∂p
∂x+c
00
−c
00
− ∂
2p
∂x2
z
detE =
− ∂p
∂x−
∂2p
∂x2
z
detE > 0 given
∂2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
iii) The case of s∗mm = s or s
∗
mm = s
The equilibrium is characterized by:
p (x) = q + αs
q + ∂q
∂yy = c
0
(y) + t
q + ∂q
∂z z + s = h
0
(z)
x = y + z
We have
∂q
∂z =
∂q
∂y =
∂p
∂x
Substitution gives:
p (y + z) = c
0
(y) + t− ∂p
∂xy + αs
c
0
(y) + t− ∂p
∂xy +
∂p
∂xz + s = h
0
(z)
p (y + z)− c0 (y) + ∂p
∂xy = t+ αs
c
0
(y)− h0 (z)− ∂p
∂xy +
∂p
∂xz = − (t+ s)
Calculating dydt and
dz
dt :
∂p
∂x
dy
dt +
∂p
∂x
dz
dt − c
00 dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2 y
dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2 y
dz
dt +
∂p
∂x
dy
dt = 1
c
00 dy
dt − h
00 dz
dt −
∂2p
∂x2 y
dy
dt −
∂2p
∂x2 y
dz
dt −
∂p
∂x
dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2 z
dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2 z
dz
dt +
∂p
∂x
dz
dt = −1
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"
∂p
∂x − c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 y +
∂p
∂x
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2 y
c
00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y −
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2 z −h
00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y +
∂2p
∂x2 z +
∂p
∂x
#·
dy
dt
dz
dt
¸
=
·
1
−1
¸
Let F =
"
∂p
∂x − c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2 y +
∂p
∂x
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2 y
c
00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y −
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2 z −h
00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y +
∂2p
∂x2 z +
∂p
∂x
#
detF =
³
2 ∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2x− c
00
´³
−h00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y +
∂2p
∂x2 z +
∂p
∂x
´
−³
c
00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y −
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2 z
´³
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2 y
´
> 0 given ∂
2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
dy
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 1 ∂p∂x + ∂2p∂x2 y
−1 −h00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y +
∂2p
∂x2 z +
∂p
∂x
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
detF =
−h
00
− ∂
2p
∂x2
y+ ∂
2p
∂x2
z+ ∂p
∂x−(−1)
³
∂p
∂x+
∂2p
∂x2
y
´
detF =
−h
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2
z+2 ∂p
∂x
detF < 0 given
∂2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
dz
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯ 2 ∂p∂x + ∂
2p
∂x2 y − c
00
1
c
00 − ∂
2p
∂x2 y −
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2 z −1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯¯
detF =
−
³
2 ∂p
∂x+
∂2p
∂x2
x−c
00´
−
³
c
00
− ∂
2p
∂x2
y− ∂p
∂x+
∂2p
∂x2
z
´
detF =
− ∂p
∂x−
∂2p
∂x2
z
detF > 0 given
∂2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
iv) The case of s∗M = s or s
∗
M = s
8
The equilibrium is characterized by:
p (x) = q + αs
q + ∂q
∂yx = c
0
(y) + t
q + ∂q
∂zx+ s = h
0
(z)
x = y + z
We have
∂q
∂z =
∂q
∂y =
∂p
∂x
Substitution gives:
p (y + z) = c
0
(y) + t− ∂p
∂xx+ αs
c
0
(y) + t− ∂p
∂xx+
∂p
∂xx+ s = h
0
(z)
p (y + z)− c0 (y) + ∂p
∂xx = t+ αs
c
0
(y)− h0 (z) = − (t+ s)
Calculating dydt and
dz
dt :
∂p
∂x
dy
dt +
∂p
∂x
dz
dt − c
00 dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2x
dy
dt +
∂2p
∂x2x
dz
dt +
∂p
∂x
dy
dt +
∂p
∂x
dz
dt = 1
c
00 dy
dt − h
00 dz
dt = −1"
∂p
∂x − c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2x+
∂p
∂x
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2x+
∂p
∂x
c
00 −h00
#·
dy
dt
dz
dt
¸
=
·
1
−1
¸
Let G =
"
∂p
∂x − c
00
+ ∂
2p
∂x2x+
∂p
∂x
∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2x+
∂p
∂x
c
00 −h00
#
detG =
³
2 ∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2x− c
00
´³
−h00
´
− c00
³
2 ∂p
∂x +
∂2p
∂x2x
´
> 0 given ∂
2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
8As shown in the proof of proposition 9 i), the monopolist is indiﬀerent with respect to
securing the high, the low or some intermediate certificate price (and correspondingly for the
wholesale price) for the case the case where the optimal solution satisfies xˆ = yˆ+ zˆ = wˆα with
wˆ ≤ zˆ. Therefore, the proof for the case of s∗M = s or s∗M also work as a proof for the case of
s < s∗M < s.
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dy
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 1 2 ∂p∂x + ∂
2p
∂x2x
−1 −h00
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
detG =
−h
00
−(−1)
³
2 ∂p
∂x+
∂2p
∂x2
x
´
detG =
−h
00
+2 ∂p
∂x+
∂2p
∂x2
x
detG < 0
given ∂
2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
dz
dt =
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ 2 ∂p∂x + ∂
2p
∂x2x− c
00
1
c
00 −1
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
detG =
−
³
2 ∂p
∂x+
∂2p
∂x2
x−c
00´
−c
00
detG =
−
³
2 ∂p
∂x+
∂2p
∂x2
x
´
detG > 0
given ∂
2p
∂x2 ≤ 0
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Figure 1: Illustration of the cc-equilibriumfor the case of an interior GC-price
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Figure 2: Profit curve for the producers of black electricity in the mc-case, illus-
trating that an intermediate GC-price will never be established in equilibrium.
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Figure 3: Profit curve for the producers of black electricity in the mc-case,
illustrating an equilibrium GC-price at the lower price bound.
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Figure 4: Profit curve for the producers of black electricity in the mc-case,
illustrating an equilibrium GC-price at the upper price bound.
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Figure 5: Profit curve for the producers of green electricity in the cm-case,
illustrating an equilibrium GC-price at the lower price bound.
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Figure 6: Profit curve for the producers of green electricity in the cm-case, illus-
trating an equilibrium GC-price at the upper price bound.
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Figure 7: Best response curves for the producers of black electricity, R(z), and
the producers of green electricity, R(y), in the mm-case, illustrating an equilib-
rium with the GC-price at the lower price bound.
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